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COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 75 OCTOBER 1975 
"FAIR" COMPENSATION AND THE 
ACCOMMODATION POWER: ANTIDOTES 
FOR THE TAKING IMPASSE IN LAND 
USE CONTROVERSIES 
JOHN J. COSTONIS* 
No. 6 
"Dinah'll miss me very much tonight, I should think." (Dinah 
was the cat.) .... "Dinah, my dear! I wish you were doivn here 
with me! There are no mice in the air, I'm afraid, but you might 
catch a bat, and that's very like a mouse, you knoiv. But do cats 
eat bats, I wonder?" And here Alice b egan to get rather sleepy, and 
went on saying to herself, in a dreamy sort of way, "Do cats eat 
bats? Do cats eat bats?" and sometimes, "Do bats eat cats?" for, 
you see, as she couldn't answer either question, it didn't much matter 
which way she put it. 
Lewis Carroll1 
Present commentary on the taking issu e  in land use controversies evokes 
the spectacle of the circus equestrian, feet planted on two charging stallions. 
Engrossed, the audience ponders what might happen if the stallions abruptly 
lurch off in opposite directions. Can the rider keep the beasts in tow? Will 
he tumble to the ground as penalty for his poor horsemanship ? Or will he 
finesse his dilemma by leaping to one or the other of the miscreants? 
Like the bedeviled horseman, government stands shakily astride the 
police and eminent domain powers as it seeks to give direction in land use 
affairs. Sadly for government, the horseman's treacherous plight is as child's 
* Visiting Professor of Law, Boalt Hall; Professor of Law, University of Illinois 
College of Law. A.B. 1959, Harvard College; LL.B. 1965, Columbia University. 
For their review and comments on earlier drafts of this article, the author wishes 
to express his thanks to Dean John Cribbet and Professors Roger Findley, John Nowak 
and Thomas Morgan---colleagues at the University of  Illinois College of Law-to Pro­
fessors Donald Hagman and Harvey Goldschmid and to Chicago realtor-land economists 
Jared Shlaes and Robert De Voy. Homage is also due to Messrs. Shlaes and De Voy for 
their invaluable aid as co-authors in earlier undertakings with the author, see note 168 
infra, conceiving of and investigating the feasibility of specific development rights trans­
fer proposals as resource protection tools. The thesis advanced in this article traces 
to these undertakings and to the patient efforts of Messrs. Shlaes and De Voy to initiate 
the author into the mysteries of land economics and real estate appraisal. Finally, a special 
and much-deserved note of thanks is due Diane Zimmerman, Columbia Law Review Ar­
ticles Editor, for her superb editorial assistance in the preparation of the final version of 
this article. Errors and distortions in this article, of course, are solely those of the author. 
1. L. CARROLL, ALICE IN WONDERLAND & THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS 4 (Grossett 
& Dunlap, Inc. ed. 1946). 
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· Th teeds it rides are ill-matched, sharing little play compared to its own. e s . , 
. . . 
. 
I f their wobbly master. l he stakes 1n n1.1!:>tenng s mpathy for one anot 1er or or . . y 
h' g ultimately to the very definitwn of the prop-them are momentous, reac m . . 
· If y t despite long-term wrestling with the dile111111a. gov-erty concept 1tse . e , 
. 
_ 
_ 
. 
ernment's legislative and judicial branches seem distant !rum rcsolnng It. And 
the commentators too are in discord, one side urging a dramatic leap to the 
police power and the other to the eminent <lomai�1 power. They s_eem_ able 
to agree only that something must be done to avoid the otherwise 1nev1table 
fall. 
Deadlock is the inexorable outcome of the taking issue so portrayed 
because the legitimate interests of government and of pri vale landowners 
cannot both be accommodated within this taut framework. The thesis of this 
article is, therefore, that the framework must be enlarged to introduce a 
third power, the acconunodation power, to fill the void that currently divides 
the police and eminent domain powers. vVithin this enlarged ira111ework, the 
concept of "fair compensation" serves as an intermediary bet ween the police 
power's absence of compensation and the eminent domain puwn 's require­
ment of "just compensation." 
Fundamental to this thesis 1s the belief that, by casting the police and 
eminent domain powers as correlatives, the phrase " tak ing- issue" is a mis­
nomer that accords neither with logic, legal doctrine nor sound policy. \\'ith 
rare exception, regulatory measures said to be takings are simply measures 
which exceed the allowable limits of the police power. Nor does it follow that 
the cure to this problem lies exclusively in eminent domain. which requires, 
in most states, that dollar compensation be fixed by a condemnation jury 
according to a "highest and best use'' standard.2 Instead, government may 
take one of three paths. Eminent domain is, of course, one solution, b ut 
government will seldom opt for it because it is often both fiscally impracti­
cable and too drastic for the modest regulatory purposes at hand. It can 
retrench to the police power by liberalizing the overly restrictive measure, 
often at the cost, however, of compromising the measure's intended planning 
result. Or, under the thesis advanced in this article it mav avoid that result 
by predicating the measure on the accommodation 
'
power
, 
and affording the landowner
_ 
fair compensation. Less demanding than just compensation, fair compensation may be secured by dollars or by some non-dollar but market-worthy alternative; it may bypass the jury trial and othe d 1 . . . . r proce ura com-ple�1ttes pres
�n�ed for emment domain actions by state statutes and consti-tut10ns; and 1t 1s not keyed to the restricted parcel's highest and best use 
2. See notes 76-110 and accompanying text infra f · · of "just" compensation. ' • or a discussion of the requirements 
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but to a standard based on a lesser economic return, designated in this article 
as the Reasonable Beneficial Use standard. 
The accommodation power's differences from the two existing powers 
and its role in public governance generally are best understood not by some 
abstract definition of its quiddities, but by what it enables government to do 
better than either of these other powers. From this perspective, I view it as 
a vehicle for fair compensation, and I advance it only because fair compen­
sation cannot find a predicate in either of the traditional powers, at least as 
conventionally understood. Were it otherwise, I would have been pleased to 
avoid the cutting edge of Occam's Razor, which advises against needless mul­
tiplication of concepts, and to take the less exposed route of folding fair 
compensation into one of the existing powers. In fact, an argument can be 
made that it could find a home in the much enlarged police power of contem­
porary times. 3 Nonetheless, I have chosen t o  use the accommodation power 
label because, in addition to my belief that it is conceptually necessary, it 
also dramatizes both the inadequacies of current police power/eminent domain 
doctrine and the fruitlessness of the debate now raging between police power 
enthusiasts and private market adherents over the future course of land use 
governance in America. 
By breaking the logjam stymying current doctrine and debate, the ac­
commodation power opens the way to a land use system that can effect strin­
gent public governance where necessary while, at the same time, dealing 
equitably with those landowners who are sharply disadvantaged by that gov­
ernance. My argument is developed in three sections. The first critiques the 
viewpoints of commentators who urge undue reliance respectively on either 
the police or the eminent domain power as the foundation of public land use 
governance. Extensive consideration is given to both schools in the convic­
tion that their all-or-nothing proclivities best illustrate the underlying ten­
sions that beset compensation jurisprudence today. The second details the 
unhappy consequences and multiple ironies of that jurisprudence. Singled 
out for special discussion is the evolution of eminent domain doctrines de­
fining the highest and best use standard as the polestar of just compensation. 
This development, though intended to protect private rights, has instead all 
but guaranteed government's recourse to the police power in situations where 
that power's use not only is unfair but tends overall to defeat the successful 
implementation of public governance schemes. The third section offers a 
functional analysis of fair compensation and its accommodation power predi­
cate, addressing both the relationship between that power and the Reasonable 
Beneficial Use standard and the institutional a rrangements that its employ­
ment requires. 
3. See text accompanying notes 152-67, 175-85 infra. 
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I. THE POLICE POWER ENTHUSIASTS AND THE PRIVATE MARKETEERS: 
A COMPARISON AND CRITIQUE 
A. The Police Power Enthusiasts4 
". . . [A] regulation of the use of land, if reasonably related to a valid 
public purpose, can never constitute a taking."5 So write the authors of The 
Taking Issue in their common drive with other police power enthusiasts to 
be rid of the irritant of compensation which attends stern land use regulation. 
The assumption of these authors that any regulation stopping short of actual 
physical appropriation may be founded exclusively on the police power is a 
noble sentiment, superficially appealing at a time of widespread despair over 
the destructive legacy of ill-regulated private development. Regrettably, how­
ever, it pays little heed to the fairness or feasibility of achieving sound land 
management on a wholly uncompensated basis. 
The economic consequences of noncompensatory regulation are disdained 
as a "matter of indifference"6 or ignored altogether, thereby shunting aside 
considerations of fairness to private landowners who become forced contrib­
utors to the common weal, and to government when its actions create wind­
falls it cannot recover under existing practices. Positions assumed to be anti­
thetical, moreover, often are not. We are told, for example, that belief in the 
continued vitality of compensation practice commits one to the "myth" that 
"the taking clause protects this right of unrestricted land use regardless of 
its impact on society,"7 or, what may be the same thing, to the view that 
"ownership of property necessarily implies a government guarantee to profit 
from it when and as the owner in his sole discretion wishes . . . .  "8 Their 
strawmanship9 only detracts from the commentators' otherwise thoughtful 
appreciation of failing governmental leadership in land use affairs and of 
emerging attitudinal and doctrinal trends that promise to modify the nation's 
long-standing bias unduly favoring private rights. 
Nor do they choose to address the repeated failure of police power-based 
4. That less space is devoted in text to a critique of the police power enthusiasts' 
position than to that of the private markete ers' is not reflective of the writer's assessment 
of the relative �
.
erits of the two positions. Instead, �t is explained by his earlier preparation 
of lengthy critiques of the former, see Costoms, Transferable Development Rights: 
Perspectii1cs for the Future at 57 passim (ASPO PAS Report No. 304 Mar. 1975): 
Costonis, Deve�opme11t Rights Transfer: 4n Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 82-85 
(1973), as a gainst the absenc� of a� eqm yalently. con;ipreh�nsive critique by the writer or other commentators of the mcreasmgly mftuent1al v1ewpomt of the private markete ers 
in land use affairs. 
5. _F. BosSELMAN, D. CALLIES & ]. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE 238 (1973) [herein-
after cited as TAKI NG]. 
6. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 172 (1971). 
7. TAKI NG, supra note 5, at 2. 
8. Sax, supra note 6, at 169. 
9. There _is, of course. a ral?ge of positions intermediate between those of the police power enthusiasts and of the private marketeers. See generally text a ccompanying notes 125-30 infra; cf. text accompanying notes 211-29 infra. 
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controls to tame discordant market forces. The sorry record of the last half­
century is plain for those who care to read it .  In mockery of well-intentioned 
police power programs, cherished landmarks fall, prime agricultural land and 
open space vanish, sprawl compounds, and comprehensive land use plans un­
ravel. Disregarded b y  police power enthusiasts are stubborn political and 
administrative obstacles, frequently traceable to market forces, that cannot 
be dissipated by deft legal argument or by appeal to the intrinsic rightness 
of proper land management practice. 
Wishful thinking also seduces the enthusiasts into overreading land use 
portents. Much has been written in recent years, for example, about "new · 
moods," "quiet revolutions," and other myth-destroying trends that foretell 
better days ahead. Only the most obdurate cynic, of course, can doubt that 
American land use attitudes, institutions and practices are indeed i n  ferment. 
But he might properly observe that while the conception of property rights 
nurtured by William Blackstone, Adam Smith and John Locke is now sus­
pect, no firm consensus has yet crystallized to take its place. The zig-zag 
fortunes of innovative land use measures in such j urisdictions as New Y ork,10 
Oregon,11 Vermont12 and Puerto Rico13 manifest that the pendulum has not 
and is not likely to swing over toward a consensus supporting noncompen­
satory regulation regardless of its economic impacts. Oregon Ex-Governor 
Tom McCall adverted to the self-defeating tensions that indiscriminate police 
power programs have g.enerated in these and other jurisdictions when he 
opined in 1974 that compensatory zoning was the nation's "next great land­
related issue."H 
Also regrettable is the penchant of these advocates for shoehorning the 
complexities of the compensation question into a single box and then resolving 
them by sweeping formulae. The Taking Issue quotation that opens this sec­
tion affords one example. Professor Sax offers another in his proposition that 
"the only appropriate question in determining whether or not compensation is 
due is whether an owner is being prohibited from making a use of his land 
10. Compare Golden v. Planning Board, 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 
138 (1972) (sustaining restrictions on subdivision development for up to 18 years ) ,  witli 
Lutheran Church in America v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 
N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) ( invalidating landmark designation of the J.P. Morgan Mansion as 
a "taking"); Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 
N.Y.S.2d 762 (Sup. Ct. 1973) ( invalidating the Tudor Parks protective transferable 
development rights prog ram as a "taking" ) ;  and Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of 
New York, Index No. 14763/69 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Cty. 1975) (invalidating landmark 
designation of Grand Central Terminal as a "taking''). 
11. See Williams, Oregon: The Fight for "Survival," SATURDAY REVIEW WoRLD 1, 
Nov. 16, 1974. 
12. See Trillin, U.S. Journal: Vermont, Act 250 and Beyond, 50 NEW YORKER, Oct. 
1974, at 128. 
13. See J. CosTONIS & R. DE VoY, THE PuERTO Rico PLAN : ENVIRONMENTAL PRO­
TECTION THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER (Conservation Trust of Puerto 
Rico & Urban Land Institute 1975) [hereinafter cited as PUERTO Rico PLAN]. 
14. Address by Tom McCall, Governor, State of Oregon, Middle Atlantic Regional 
Conference, Mar. 29, 1974, on file at the Columbia Law Review. 
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that has no conflict-creating spill-over effects."15 
Despite the finality or ele­
gance of these ukases, they are unlikely to exorcise th
e taking demon. 
Against them must be posed Professor Philbrick's sage obs
ervation that 
"the concept of property never has been, is not, and never can
 be of definite 
content."16 Nowhere is this comment more vividly apt than in lan
d use law 
which is, above all, a law of contexts. Even Proscrustes, I suspect, would 
shrink from confronting with a single measuring rod areas as diverse as 
growth management resource protection, incentive zoning, aircraft overflight, 
interim zoning and nonconforming use amortization; and these are only a 
few of the contexts whose unique features so complicate the compensation 
question. Nor would he find that yardstick adequate to resolve compensation 
issues whose outcome in a half-century of litigation has turned upon an entire 
matrix of variables, each of shifting weight depending upon context and cur­
rent community values.17 
B. The Private Marketeers 
At the opposite pole from the police power advocates are those com­
mentators who repose their faith in the marketplace and not in government 
as the regulator of land use affairs. As adherents of an economic philosophy 
associated principally with the University of Chicago, they would compel 
government to compensate when it regulates all but nuisance-like land uses. 
But their support for the eminent domain power instead of the police power 
is only a by-product of their more fundamental conviction that government 
ought largely to get out of the land use field, a conviction mirrored in Professor 
Ellickson's argument that "zoning is today out of control and must be severely 
curtailed if not entirely replaced."18 Building on the work of Bernard Siegan19 
and other private market adherents,20 Ellickson proposes a substitute founded 
on the "laissez-faire distribution of property rights," which he defines as "an 
imaginary legal world where each landowner can choose to pursue any activity 
within the boundaries of his parcel without fear of liability to his neighbors or 
governmental sanction."21 Recognizing that some forms of land use do injure 
neighboring landowners, he also proposes that these harms be "internalized" 
to their authors by three devices: first, expanded use of private bargaining 
15. Sax, supra note 6, at 164. 
696 ��·9Js�i.lbrick, Changing Conceptions of Property in Law, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 691, 
Cent��� FX�:r��������I u��ujue:;����d:��e i�t:;Pm���1� of the variables r.e�ected in 20.th ncss: Co111111c11ts on the Ethical Foundations of "] t aC Propert'l, ,l/tility, and Fair-L. REV. 11�5 passim (I 967). us ompensation Law, 80 HARV. 18. Elhckson, A ltcrnatives to Zoning· C t N · Use Co11trols, 40 U. Cm. L. REV. 681 73'1 c197'.Bn [� 1;'1S'fnce �itles and Fines .as Land 19. See B. SIEGAN LAND UsE WITHOUT z erema ter cite� as Alternatives]. Ho1t.Slo11, 13 ]. LA\:V. & 'E'.coN •. 71 0970). 
ONING (1972); S1egan, Non-Zoning in 
20. See authorities cited m Alternatives supra note 18, at 682 n.2. 21. Id. at 684. ' 
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arrangements m which landowners purchase from their neighbors the right 
to conduct nuisance uses ;22 second, revitalization of nuisance law to penalize 
nuisance-perpetrating freeloaders ;23 and, third, recognition of a limited role 
for government in dealing with "pervasive nuisances," (those that are not 
amenable to resolution by the first two devices) .24 The pervasive nuisance 
class is apparently quite limited and includes, in his representative listing, such 
matters as signs, building heights, overhead utility lines, offstreet parking, and 
yard, setback and subdivision requirements.25 Government's role would be 
two-fold. It would administer a system of fines against pervasive nuisances 
whose degree of "noxiousness" can be objectively plotted.26 And it would 
adopt mandatory r egulations akin to conventional zoning measures to bar 
pervasive nuisances of indeterminate noxiousness. 27 
The private marketeers' position is provocative and, in many respects, 
enlightening. They see clearly what the police power enthusiasts choose to 
ignore and vice-versa. Foremost among their concerns is public governance's 
haphazard economic consequences. Hence, Bernard Siegan's quote from Mason 
Gaffney: "When the planning commission and the zoning board flit about 
sprinkling little golden showers here rather than there, they make millionaires 
out of some and social reformers of others."28 Then too, they highlight the 
role of compensation in protecting individual liberty29 and encouraging ra­
tional decision-making by exposing the true costs of collective judgments that 
impose severe charges on a few or afford benefits unequal to their costs.30 Also 
welcome is their attention to the various private and quasi-private arrange­
ments that contribute to efficient land use patterns while escaping many of 
zoning's well-known drawbacks.81 
Unfortunately, these valuable insights are all but cancelled out by two 
grave deficiencies. First is their jaundiced view of the propriety of public 
governance in appropriate land use contexts. Second-and correlative to the 
22. Id. at 711-19. 
23. Id. at 719-61. 
24. Id. at 761-79. 
25. Id. 
26. Id. at 761. 
27. Id. at 761-62. 
28. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J. LAW & EcoN. 71, 128 (1970). 
29. Sec A. DUNHAM, PROPERTY, CITY PLANNING, AND LIBERTY IN LAW AND LAND, 
28 passim (Haar ed. 1964). Given Professor Dunham's status as Chief Reporter of the 
ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT (ODE, an instrument which calls for increased rather 
than less centralized planning, it may seem anomalous to classify him with the , priva:te 
marketeers. As Professor Ellickson properly notes, however, Professor Dunham s writ­
ings place him "[a]mong the most distinguished and persistent .. . s�eptics" of the 
"wisdom of greater governmental intervention in land markets." Alternatives, supra note 
18, at 682 n.6. 
30. See A. DUNHAM, supra note 29, at 40, 43; Dunham, From Rt"al Enclosure to 
Re-Enclosure of Urban Land, 35 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 1238, 1253-54 (1960) [hereinafter cited 
as Enclosure]. 
31. See generally Alternatives, supra note 18; B. SlEGAN, LAND UsE WITHOUT 
ZONING (1972). 
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first-is their indefensibly broad conception of private property rights. These 
deficiencies are treated in the following two subsections. 
l. The Marketplace as a Regulator of Urban Growth. To this observer, 
the market's capacity to insure orderly urban growth without a framework of 
publicly determined goals and incentives is highly problematic. Perhaps the 
market is superior to zoning in resolving localized conflicts among neighboring 
landowners. But is it also superior to zoning and other forms of public gov­
ernance in dealing with larger questions, such as growth management ? Profes­
sor Ellickson believes so, arguing as follows: 
If a particular area becomes too dense, its residents will perceive 
the disadvantages of this high density and tend to leave; growth con­
trols are thus not needed to protect people from "unlivable" condi­
tions. When conditions are unlivable for many residents, emigration 
will reduce population densities and tend to establish equilibrium. If 
California's attractiveness as a place to live were to diminish because 
of rapid population growth and the resulting additions to traffic con­
gestion and air pollution, private forces would end net migration to 
California ; population planning is not necessary to accomplish this 
result.32 
But his argument raises more questions than it resolves. Contrary to the 
assumption that pervades his and Siegan's work, zoning does not exhaust 
public governance; it is only one of a variety of planning tools, a point which 
is implicit in his reference to transportation, pollution and other concomitants 
of urban growth. Properly framed, the issue shifts to the comparative merits 
of zoning and other forms of public governance working in conjunction with 
market forces, versus the unregulated marketplace as the proper determinant 
of this growth. Again, while zoning is not the whole of public governance, 
it is certainly more than a nuisance-preventative. True, its field of operation 
does encompass such matters as compatibility of neighboring uses, yard and 
setback requirements, building heights and the like. To stop there, however, 
is to ignore modern zoning potential, either independent of or coordinated 
with other public governance devices, to deal affirmatively with a broad range 
of positive concerns that, while hardly categorizable as "nuisances," do serve 
health, safety and welfare goals firmly based in evolving community stan­
dards.33 
These rather obvious facts are passed over because they jibe poorly with 
a model founding efficient land use control on private bargaining transactions 
backsto�ped somewhat-but not too much-by governmental machinery. More 
than this anachronistic model is needed, however, to deal with urban growth 
and other non-local planning problems, a point driven home by the California 
32. Alternatives, supra note 18, at 769-70. 
M 
33. Sec generally ]. CosTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT· L ARKETPLACE 162-66 (1974); D. HAGMAN U . ANDMARK PRESERVATION AND THE CONTROL LAW 86-99 (1971). ' RBAN PLANNING AND LAND DEVELOPMENT 
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Supreme Court in recounting the factors that led to the creation of the (Lake) 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency. 
The water that the Agency is to purify cannot be confined within 
one county or state; it circulates freely throughout Lake Tahoe. The 
air which the Agency must preserve from pollution knows no political 
boundaries. The wildlife which the Agency should protect ranges 
freely from one local jurisdiction to another. Nor can the popu­
lation and explosive development which threatens the region be 
contained by any of the local authorities which govern parts of the 
Tahoe Basin. Only an agency transcending local boundaries can de­
vise, adopt and put into operation solutions for the problems besetting 
the region as a whole. Indeed, the fact that the [Tahoe Planning 
Agency] Compact is the product of the cooperative efforts and mu­
tual agreement of two states is impressive proof that its subject mat­
ter and objectives are of regional rather than local concern.34 
The court's immediate object was to sustain the Compact against a charge 
that it invaded the home rule ·powers of local governments. Where even local 
governmental arrangements have fallen short of resolving growth problems, 
however, the hope that private arrangements can do so seems chimerical 
indeed. 
Unsatisfactory too is the glib solution to the overdensity problem ad­
vanced by Professor Ellickson-that the community or the state need not be 
alarmed because "private forces" will produce "equilibrium." However useful 
the equilibrium concept may be for the economist, when transplanted to the 
planning context it begs a number of questions vital to basic community values. 
Why, for example, should the community or state meekly acquiesce in conges­
tion, air pollution and the like when it could strive to anticipate and mitigate 
these scourges? Suggested by the author are two related responses, both con­
cededly based on his "intuitive estimates of the allocative and distributional 
impacts of alternative internalization systems."35 First, the market is better 
able than government to allocate resources efficiently.36 Second, successful 
management of these problems is beyond the reach of existing public gov­
ernance techniques and institutions in any event. 37 
If intuition is to be the guide, the first response surely rings false in its 
application to the nation's air, water, and land resources. The cutting edge of 
34. People er rel. Younger v. County of E l  Dorado, 5 Cal. 3d 480, 493-94, 487 P.Zd 
1193, 1201, 96 Cal. Rptr. 553, 561 (1971). 
35. Alternatives, supra note 18, at 781. 
36. Id. passim. 
37. As noted in the text accompanying note 42 infra, this point is not systematically 
addressed through empirical investigation or proof by either Ellickson or Siegan, who 
rely instead on an enumeration of public governance's abuses-most of which, incidentally, 
are remediable through judicial processes-and on the tautology that since the market 
is the best allocator of land resources, public governance is to be avoided whenever pos­
sible. For an illustration of Professor Ellickson's skepticism concerning the capabilities 
of public governance, see Alternatives, supra note 18, at 769 n.291. 
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· f h ned by none other than the current environmental movement, in act
, was o 
. as 
the deplorable failure of the marketplace to allocate
 these resources effi:1en�l: r. 
But my objection to the efficiency ar�ument runs cleep�r tha
1: mtu1tion, 
reaching to the definition of the term "efficiency" itself. Effic�
ency 1s a we�sel 
word which, as used by Professor Ellickson, has all the consisten
cy of quick­
silver. Its orthodox signification in economics is the maximization of total 
benefit from the use of resources through private choice based on calculations 
of private benefit or utility. When transported to the land use field, on the 
other hand, it must be expanded to incorporate the variable of community 
standards as authoritatively expressed in legislation, judicial precedents and 
other pertinent sources, a point Professor Ellickson explicitly acknowledges 
when he asserts that nuisance liability should attach to the "host landowner 
only if [his proposed land use] is perceived as unneighborly according to 
contemporary community standards."39 
Expansion of the definition is necessary for at least two reasons. First, 
the collective determination of efficiency in land use affairs involves value as 
well as fact judgments, the former encompassing a range of considerations that 
play little if any role in exclusively private calculations of private benefit. An 
outcome that might be perceived as "efficient" by a mortgagee and his devel­
oper may be quite the opposite if measured against such community objectives 
as those affording the policy basis for establishing the Tahoe Regional Plan­
ning Agency. 
Second, a broadened concept of efficiency is required even at the factual 
level because public agencies may not only be better situated than private 
landowners to anticipate and assess the pertinent facts, but they may be the 
only entities in a position to do so. A case in point is the sorry plight of hun­
dreds of purchasers of tract houses in Houston, a city lauded by Bernard Sie­
gan for turning thumbs down on centralized planning and zoning. That city's 
unregulated growth has been so rapid in recent years that, to satisfy increased 
water demands, groundwater has had to be pumped from under these tract 
houses. The result: their subsidence and destruction.40 That this wasteful 
outcome would not be anticipated by specific subdividers and their customers 
is entirely predictable, given the complex planning and civil engineerings fac­
tors that were unlikely to come to the attention of either-until it was too late. 
Despite his apparent concession that community standards ought to play 
a key role in controlling nuisance behavior, Professor Ellickson gives short 
3�. Economists more 
,
concern�d with the phenomenon of "market failure" are less sanru115 about th�
l 
mprket s capacity to allocate resources efficiently in the environmental 
�:c��· e.r!f:nserOaLUYTION. 
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shrift in his excerpt both to what these standards are, and to the foregoing 
issues of value and fact determination. Land use, environmental quality and 
community welfare--each the object of profound deference under contemporary 
community standards-are delivered over to the tender mercies of the market­
place with the Panglossian assurance that "equilibrium" will insure an opti­
mum outcome. Far better advice, I'm afraid, is afforded in Ada Louise 
Huxtable's warning that "if there were no other way than to let sound business 
practice take its course, there would be little hope for the urban environment."41 
The redwoods, prime agricultural lands, historic landmarks and general well 
being of community residents in the buffeted area are not going t o  reappear 
magically when equilibrium sets in. Loss of some of these resources, such as 
the redwoods and farmlands, will be total. Prospects for others, such as unique 
urban environments that are the work of decades or centuries are little better. 
The residents of the area that becomes "unlivable" through overdensity come 
off badly as well. Are the psychological and other attachments to the com­
munity of those wealthy enough to leave t o  be ignored? And what of the 
market's legacy of scrambled land use patterns and a deteriorated environment 
to those obliged by circumstance to stay behind? 
To acknowledge these as serious problems is to recognize the need for 
public governance in contexts where private choice deviates markedly from 
community standards. Because such intervention is anathema to the marketeers' 
a priori dictates, however, these problems are largely ignored. To the extent 
that they are perceived, public governance is dismissed as a means of dealing 
with them on the formulistic basis that "city planning or public land use con­
trols would only make matters worse from an efficiency standpoint."42 The 
"proof" offered for this proposition consists of little more than recitation of 
the abuses to which public governance is vulnerable. 
This tautological reasoning is especially disappointing because the question 
of public governance's capabilities is an important one meriting serious investi­
gation. For the time being at least, it must b e  viewed as several steps short of 
conclusive. Establishing that public governance is subject to abuse proves 
neither that it is inherently unserviceable in its present or an upgraded form 
nor that the market alternative is itself free o f  abuse. Indeed, if the question 
is to turn on abuse, the marketeers surely have the worse of the argument! 
Only those blind to the market's dismal record as a deterrent to orderly growth 
would argue that public governance is its equal in this respect, however mis­
conceived that governance may be. In the absence of persuasive evidence of 
public governance's inherent inadequacies, my own inclination is to deal with 
its conceded abuses b y  upgrading that governance. If sound land use manage-
41. Huxtable, What's Best for Business Can Ravage Cities, N.Y. Times, Apr. 6, 1975, 
§ 2 (Arts & Leisure), at 1, col. 6. 
42. Alternatives, supra note 18, at 683. 
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ment should in fact be shown to exceed the capabilities of public governance, I 
too would fall back on the market. My reasoning, however, would not be that 
the market will make things better-a position that, frankly, is absurd in view 
of the market's track record over this century-but rather that public gov­
ernance will only make them worse. 
z. Nuisance: A Dubious Criterion of Private Property Rights. Under 
Professor Ellickson's proposed "laissez faire distribution of private property 
rights," all economic expectancies associated with property ownership other 
than those of a nuisance-creating variety are the property of the landowner. 
Nuisances excepted, government must compensate when its regulation frus­
trates any of these expectancies, and that compensation presumably would be 
keyed to the difference between the market values of the parcel before and 
after regulation. It is no understatement that, were these prescriptions con­
stitutionally compelled, public governance as we know it today would cease 
forthwith. This result, of course, would sit well with the marketeers whose 
view on the eminent domain question is essentially a stalking horse for their 
dogmatic opposition to public interference in private land markets. 
While they certainly can't be faulted for lack of chutzpah in their attempt 
to resurrect the property conceptions of Blackstone, Smith and Locke, they 
come off less well on social policy grounds. As pointed out in the previous 
subsection, once community standards are introduced as a determinant of 
efficiency, the field of licit public regulation is necessarily and substantially 
enlarged beyond the ambit described by conventional nuisance law. This is 
not to endorse The Taking Issue's claim that compensation is never required 
for regulatory measures that further community standards, but only to under­
score that entitlement to compensation should be determined by a yardstick 
less favorable to the private landowner than the nuisance criterion. 
The marketeers' view of property rights is outmoded on another count 
in these times of extensive publicly-initiated capital improvements projects 
and regulatory programs, namely, in its insistence that the economic expectan­
cies associated with the ownership of land ought always to be regarded as the 
"property" of the owner. To test out this proposition, suppose that, in im­
plementing community standards favoring the retention of one sector of a 
town in residential use, government zones out motel and commercial uses 
there. Then, suppose government also decides to build a highway alongside 
this and an adjoining sector. The effect of these decisions is to quadruple the 
value of Farmer Brown's 50-acre tract in the latter sector which he is now 
profitably farming. Because of the highway, the market anticipates that Farmer 
Bro':n's �ract, if upzoned from its present agricultural-low density residential 
classification to a motel-commercial status, will be prized by national motel and 
retail chains as a sitf' for their facilities. Should Farmer Brown be deemed to 
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"own" the economic expectancies that government initiated by its zoning of 
the residential sector and its decision to build the highway? Stated another 
way, if commercial-motel uses on Farmer Brown's tract are not "nuisances," 
ought he to be able to prevail in an inverse condemnation action for frustrated 
economic expectancies if government refuses to upzone his land ? 
For Professor E llickson, the answer apparently is a confident "yes." But 
is the matter really that simple? If these expectancies are created through no 
effort of Farmer Brown, why should they be deemed his "property" ? Again, 
if the marketeers are solicitous of landowners disadvantaged by the uneven 
distributional impact of land use controls, should they be so hasty to endorse a 
rule that mulcts government for the dubious end of providing Farmer Brown 
a windfall? And, as a corollary to the second question, if allowing government 
to recoup some.portion of Farmer Brown's unearned increment would provide 
it with the resources to deal fairly with those landowners who are disadvan­
taged by public regulation,48 is it defensible to bar this outcome by an approach 
that limits noncompensatory governmental intervention to the narrow sphere 
of nuisance control? Doctrinaire economic theory diverts the marketeers from 
paying serious attention to these questions despite intimations in their com­
mentary suggesting less than a negative response to them.44 For the time 
being, however, their position must be read to disagree with R. W. G. Bryant's 
observation that "there are various and different concepts of government, but 
it could not reasonably be suggested that it is a proper function of government 
to take a minority of its citizens for a free ride. "45 
II. THE POLICE AND EMINENT DOMAIN POWERS: OF CATS AND BATS 
Despite their discordant outcomes, contenders in the public governance/ 
private rights debate begin with the common premise that the police and em­
inent domain powers are correlatives. Responsible for that premise is Justice 
Holmes' famous aphorism in Pennsylvania Coal Company v. Mahon that "the 
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent 
[under the police power ] , if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a 
taking."46 His aphorism, coupled with both legislative inattention to the com­
pensation problem and a conservative state judiciary's elaboration of extrava­
gant eminent domain doctrines, has contributed immeasurably to the impasse 
43. One illustration of a technique employing this approach is transferable develop­
ment rights. See text accompanying notes 168-72 infra. 
44. For example, Professor Ellickson apparel}tly approves the transferable develop­
ment rights technique in prin ciple; see text accompanying notes 168-72 infra, and Alter­
natives, supra note 18, at 703. Professor Dunham approves of a system in which landowners 
are charged for the increases in the value of their property attributable to public planning 
schemes and compensated for losses attendant upon such schemes; see Property, City 
Planning and Liberty in LAW AND LAND 28, 36-37 (Haar ed. 1964). 
45. R. w. G. BRYANT, LAND: PRIVATE PROPERTY PUBLIC CONTROL 160 (1972). 
46. 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). 
' 
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that today stymies the evolution of a rational compensation practice in land use 
controversies. 
The impasse is by no means foreordained. In speaking but a half-truth, 
the aphorism did not necessarily bar the way to the evolution of rational pra�­
tice. Reinterpreted in light of settled precedent subsequent to Pennsylvania 
Coal, Holmes' language offers no objection to the emergence of a power-the 
accommodation power-which is intermediate between the police and eminent 
domain powers and which, in providing fair compensation to meritorious 
claimants, affords government a feasible alternative to the prohibitively expen­
sive "j ust compensation. "  Concurrent with and following Pennsylvania Coal, 
moreover, the federal j udiciary not only laid the foundations for a less demand­
ing body of eminent domain rules but for a re-evaluation of property concep­
tions along lines that mesh fully with the accommodation power and fair 
compensation theses advanced here. 
These theses are treated in the following section. The concerns of this 
section are, first, a brief explanation of why Holmes' aphorism tells only half 
of the story ; second, an account of the disparate evolution of eminent domain 
and related doctrines in the state and federal courts ; and third, a portrayal 
of the multiple ironies characterizing compensation law at the present time. 
A. "Takings" That Are Not Takings 
With the benefit of a half-century's hindsight, furnished principally by 
land use litigation, the gold and the dross in the Holmes aphorism are readily 
separated. The gold obviously is its recognition that some, indeed most forms 
of regulation may be predicated on the police power. The dross is his statement 
that " . . .  if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." Both as 
chief justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court47 and as an associ­
ate justice of the U.S.  Supreme Court,48 Holmes was deeply influenced by the 
laissez-faire property notions of his day, and he was not immune to overstate­
ment in defending those notions. The quoted language is a clear case in point 
because all that Pennsylvania Coal actually decided was that the statute chal­
lenged in that case was an invalid police power measure, and not a literal taking. 
Were that statute and the countless zoning measures that have been de­
clared "takings" since Pennsylvania Coal truly exercises of the eminent do­
main power, a very different result would attend a decision favoring the private 
litigant. The very enactment of such measures would obligate government 
�o pay j�st compensation and, in return, government would receive a property 
mtere
�t m the challenger's land or, under the special facts in Pennsylvania 
Coal, m the challenger's less-than-fee holding.49 All such litigation, moreover, 
47. See text accompanying notes 235-51 infra 48. See. TAK!NG, supra note 5, at 125-28, 240-46. 49. At issue m the case was whether a state legislature could employ the police power 
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would take the form of inverse condemnation actions. In reality, of course, 
neither courts nor p rivate litigants visualize challenges to regulatory measures 
in these terms. I nstead, the goal of this litigation in conventional land use 
disputes is simply to preclude application of the measure to the restricted 
parcel on the basis of its constitutional infirmity.60 What is achieved, in short, 
is declaratory relief. The sole exception to this mild outcome occurs where the 
challenged measure i s  either intended to eventuate in actual public ownership 
of the land or has already caused government to encroach on the land with 
trespassory consequences that are largely irreversible.111 
More significant for the purposes of this article is the aphorism's implica­
tion that the police and domain powers are correlatives. Under the correlatives 
model, the police power preempts the "regulatory" sphere as the tool for pur­
suing community health, safety and welfare goals on a noncompensatory basis ; 
it is constrained only by the constitutional test of "public purpose." The em­
inent domain power, i n  its turn, is limited to outright appropriation of private 
land on a compensated basis ; it is subject to the "public use" test which in 
Holmes' time connoted actual physical use b y  the public.52 What could not 
be done under the police power had to be done under the eminent domain 
power or not at all. 
The position offered in this article disputes the correlatives model on two 
counts. First, a third power should be recognized, the accommodation power, 
which furnishes an alternative to the eminent domain power for curing or 
enacting regulatory measures that cannot be sustained under the police power. 
Further discussion of this contention is deferred to the article's third section. 
Second, doctrinal and policy developments since Pennsylvania Coal dictate 
replacement of the correlatives model with arf approach under which the police 
and eminent domain powers, along with the accommodation power, are per­
ceived as functionally interchangeable tools-subj ect to constitutional com­
pensation requirements-for achieving government's regulatory goals.113 
to abrogate a deed restriction reserving mineral rights to the corporate grantor and im­
munizing it from liability for subsidence damage resulting from its mining operations 
below the deeded parcel. 
SO. For a recent treatment of the point with an exhaustive collection of cases and 
authorities, see Note, Inverse Condemnation: I ts Availability in Challenging the Validity 
of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439 ( 1 974) . For the view that inverse con­
demnation rather than declaratory relief should be available at the private challenger's 
option, see, e.g., Badler, Municipal Zoning Liability in Damages-A New Ca1tse of Action, 
S URBAN LAWYER 25 ( 1973 ) ; Enclosure, supra note 30. This contention was apparently 
sustained by a California appellate court in the controversial decision, HFH Ltd. v. 
Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 908, 1 16 Cal. Rptr. 436 ( 1974) (semble ) ; ct. Brown v. 
Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 385 F. Supp. 1 1 28 ( 1973). The Cahforma Supreme 
Court has granted leave to appeal in HFH, and its r esolution of the question is imminent. 
The general problem is r e-addressed in text accompanying notes 167, 21 1-29 infra. 
51. See Note, Inverse Condemnation: .Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of 
a Zoning Ordinance, supra note 50, at 1447. 
52. The evolution and desuetude of the use-by-the-public test is recounted in Com­
ment, The P1tblic Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE 
L.J. 599 (1949).  
53. Only the triad of the police, accommodation and eminent domain powers is treated 
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Judicial expansion of "public use" to comport with government's broad­
ened involvement in land use affairs has deprived the correlatives model of 
w hatever validity it may have had at the time Pennsylvania Coal was decided. 
The demise of the narrow use-by-the-public criterion54 removed the legal 
objections that purportedly stood in the way of the eminent domain power's 
employment for any legitimate regulatory purpose. As decisions approving its 
employment for such varied purposes as historic preservation,55 zoning,56 
comprehensive planning,57 and urban renewal58 signal, the public use limitation 
now differs little, if at all, from the police power's public purpose test. 
Despite these developments, the correlatives model continues to distort 
understanding of the relationship that the police and eminent domain powers 
bear to one another and to their common goal of regulation. Perhaps the 
classic case in point is Berman v. Parker,59 a U.S. Supreme Court opinion 
authored by Justice Douglas, that definitively confirmed that the Fifth Amend­
ment's public use requirement is as a mple as the police power's public purpose 
test. At issue in B erman was whether the District of Columbia's employment 
of the eminent domain power to achieve various regulatory goals of its urban 
renewal program comported with the public use criterion. Yet the reader is 
puzzled to find as the opinion's lead analytical sentence Justice Douglas' 
proposition that " [ w J e deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been 
known as the police power."6° Confusion compounds in his reasoning, first, 
that the eminent domain power is but a subcategory of the police power ;61 
second, that aesthetic goals may be a c hieved as freely under the police power 
as under the eminent domain power ( despite the former's absence of compen­
sation) ;62 and, finally, that " [ t] he rights of these property owners are satisfied 
when they receive that j ust compensation which the Fifth Amendment exacts 
as the price of the taking. "63 
in the text a� too�s by which government may pursue its regulatory goals because the 
con.cern of this article is the inadequacy-functionally and conceptually-of the traditional police pow�r /eminent domain bifurcation. That government can employ other powers, such 
as the taxmg P<;>wer, for this purpose is, of course, understood. See generally Costonis, 
Development Rights Transfer : An Ezploratory Essay 83 y ALE L J 75 104-07 n 110  
( 1973) . 
' . . ' . 
5�. See Comment, The Public Use Limitation in Eminent Domain : An Advance 
Requiem, 58 YALE L.J. 599 ( 1949) . 
55. E.g., Roe v. Kansas ex rel. Smith, 278 U.S. 191 ( 1929) ; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 99 F. ?upp. 71� (E.D. Pa. 195 1 ) ,  aff'd, 215 F.2d 140 ( 3d Cir. 1954) . 
. 56. E.g., Kansas City v. Kmdle, 446 S.W.2d 807 ( Mo. 1969) ; State ex rel. Twin City Bldg. & Inv. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1 ,  1 76 N.W. 1 59 ( 1 920) .  57. Cf. , �omm
�:mwealth v. Rosso, 95 P.R.R. 488 ( 1967) ( sustaining the Puerto Rico Land �dmm1str.atton Act, P.R. LA�S ANN. tit. 23, § 7 ( 1 974) ,  which permits con­demnation of private land for an entire gamut of public governance purposes) . 58. E.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 ( 1 954) 
· Gohld Realty Co v City of Hart-ford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 ( 1 954) . 
' 
· · 
59. 348 U.S. 26 ( 1954 ) . 
60. Id. at 32. 
61.  Id. 
62. Id. at 33, 34. 
63. Id. at 36. 
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Taken literally the opinion makes little sense. If the police power-<on­
ventionally defined as noncompensatory regulation-possesses the remarkable 
attributes claimed for it, why was it necessary for Justice Douglas to qualify 
these claims with the concluding proviso concerning compensation ? Again, 
what does it mean to reduce the eminent domain power to peonage as a 
subcategory of the police power ? 
Given the opinion's expansion of the public use concept, a second 'inter­
pretation of Justice Douglas' reasoning, one that comports with the logic 
though not the labels of my proposed substitute for the correlatives model, 
is plausible.64 Under this interpretation, the Court's use of the phrase "police 
power" connotes the full range of government's legislative powers,65 and 
makes that phrase equivalent to my term "regulation." So conceived, J ustice 
Douglas' treatment of the police power as an umbrella power implementable 
by various subordinate powers--or, better yet, by tools such as eminent do­
main-is identical with my use of "regulation" as a genus including among 
its species the police, accommodation and eminent domain powers. As much 
is implicit in Justice Douglas' observation that " [ o] nee the object [of a chal­
lenged legislative program] is within the authority of Congress, the right to 
realize it through the exercise of eminent domain is clear. For the power of 
eminent domain is merely the means to the end."66 
Despite the functional equivalence of my framework and the one offered 
in Berman, my nomenclature is employed in this article for several reasons. 
However the Supreme Court may use those terms, other courts have consis­
tently treated the police and eminent domain powers as co-equal in status ; 
for them, the police power has a narrower meaning-i.e., noncompensatory 
regulation-than for Justice Douglas. The transition from this settled under­
standing to the Douglas framework would not b e  frictionless ; this is pointed 
up by the frequent mis-citation of Berman as a precedent approving the sweep­
ing use of noncompensatory regulation to achieve aesthetic goals, regardless 
of the costs to private owners.67 To add further to the confusion, if the Douglas 
nomenclature were adopted, a new name would then have to be invented for 
that tool which the state courts currently call the "police power." With the 
addition by this article of the phrase "accommodation power" and with the 
ambiguous meaning of "police power," introducing yet another term seems in­
advisable. 
64. I am indebted to my colleague, Jolm Nowak, for this suggestion. 
65. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53-54 ( 1905) ; West Coast Hotel 
Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 389 ( 1937) ; Bibb v. Navaho Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 
529 ( 1959) . 
66. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 ( 1954) ( emphasis added) .  
67. See, e.g., Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 1 18, 121 (10th 
Cir. 1973 ) ,  cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 ( 1974); City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. 
Ry., 413 F.2d 762, 767 ( 8th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 985 (1969) ; cf. Village of 
Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 5 ( 1974) (Douglas J.) . 
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B. The Eminent Domain Power: An Implausible Tool for Land Use Gov­
ernance 
The Holmes aphorism, coined to bar governmental overreaching, has had 
precisely the opposite effect. It instead confronts courts with a Hobson's 
Choice : they must either sustain a noncompensatory measure that imposes 
unfair losses on the landowner, or they must invalidate the measure alto­
gether-thereby forcing government to walk the eminent domain plank to 
secure its desired planning outcome. As the readers of The Taking Issue are 
well aware, the courts have increasingly opted for the first solution. But it is 
my judgment that this choice is less the product of the courts' embrace of a 
"new mood" i n  land use law than of sober recognition that acquiescence in 
the legislative body's use of the police power is simply the lesser of two evils. 
Eminent domain, they rightly appreciate, is often neither a realistic nor a 
fitting corrective for overbroad police power regulation. As even an old-mood 
court stated with rare candor in upholding a nonconforming use amortization 
measure : 
The effectiveness of eminent domain is restricted by the necessity that 
the purchase must be for public use, by the complexities of adminis­
trative procedures and by the high cost of reimbursing the property 
owners.68 
How did this polarity come about ? An excellent clue is found in Mendes 
Hershman's plaint that "we have condemnation concepts and procedures which 
developed in an agrarian society prior to the middle of the 19th Century, 
which we are trying to fit into an urban society in a vastly different economy."69 
Little need and even less sympathy for stringent land use regulation was to be 
found in laissez-faire, 1 9th Century America. Eminent domain's function then 
was perceived as compensating landowners for the outright appropriation of 
their land for the condemnor's affirmative use ; it was not seen as a curative 
for overly stringent land use controls.70 Because this power was delegated to 
and often abused by such powerful private condemnors as the railroads, more­
o:er, nu�ero�s state constitutional and statutory safeguards were adopted to 
circumscribe its use.71 Elaborate procedural requirements, including manda­
tory use
_ 
of juries to ascertain condemnation awards,72 were imposed. And, 
substantively the const1"t t" l bl"  73 
· 
• -
• u 10na pu 1c use and J USt compensat1on1 4  stan-
365-
�· 89s7) _v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301 ,  308, 129 A.2d 363, 
69. Hershman, Compensation--Just d U · A S · ' · · Bus. LAWYER 285, 291 (1966) . 
an n7ust: tudy m Emment Domain, 21 
70. See generally TAKING, supra note 5, ch. 7. 71. For an account of this evolutio d f h · see generally 1 L. 0RGEL, VALUATION UN
an ° t L various types of safeguards enacted, 
(2d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as 0RGEL] .  
DER THE A W  OF EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 1 ,  § 6 
72. See examples cited .in 1 0RGEL, supra note 71 ch 1 § 8 73. See text accompanying note 52 st,Pra ' · ' · 74. See text accompanying notes 77-109
. 
infra. 
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<lards were jealously construed, both to limit the instances in which the em­
inent domain power could be employed and to enlarge condemnation awards. 
With the leap forward of public land use governance in the 20th Century, 
a corresponding shift in eminent domain doctrine was necessary to transform 
condemnation into a feasible tool for mitigating often harsh private impacts 
of that governance. But l egislatures largely ignored the need for change and 
the state courts modified only the public use concept. Because there was no 
equivalent easing of eminent domain's procedural strictures and just compen­
sation rules, expanding the public use concept only exacerbated the problem : 
it was futile to invite government to employ eminent domain to soften stern 
regulatory measures and then impose conditions on its exercise which placed 
it beyond government's reach. Little will be said here about its continuing 
procedural complexities other than to note that the federal judiciary ruled long 
ago that nothing in the federal constitution requires government to be ham­
strung with the jury requirement found in many state constitutions and stat­
utes.75 Instead, the targets of this discussion are two doctrines, largely 
judicially evolved, that flesh out the just compensation requirement. The first 
mandates that compensation be paid in dollars. The second, that it be measured 
by a highest and best use standard. Of particular concern will be the grudging 
way that state courts have reformulated that standard to take account of the 
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Com­
pany,76 a decision which dethroned the market-oriented highest and best use 
standard as the determinant of permissible noncompensatory public interven­
tion into private land markets. 
1 .  Just Compensation as Dollar Compensation. Government has scarce 
dollar resources to offset the private impact of public regulation. As allocator 
and, frequently, outright creator of lucrative development opportunities, on 
the other hand, government has at its disposal a substantial pool of non­
dollar but marketworthy compensatory alternatives that could be devoted to 
this purpose. This possibility is currently overlooked, in part becaus e  of the 
just compensation doctrines discussed below and in part because of a refusal 
to acknowledge that land regulation's fiscal consequences are as direct and 
significant as its physical development objects. It has also been stillborn be­
cause, to put it bluntly, private enrichment of u nscrupulous public officials and 
favored landowners siphons off much of the wealth that would otherwise be 
available to equalize the gains and losses that attend public regulation. 
Though the fact i s  widely ignored, the Fifth Amendment's just compen­
sation requirement allows sufficient latitude to legitimize non-dollar compen­
sation in the borderline situation where overly stringent public regulation is 
75. See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 593 (1897) ; see generally Blair, Federal Con­
demnation Proceedings and the Seventh Amendment, 4 1  HARV. L. REV. 29 (1927). 
76. 272 U.S. 365 (1926). 
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declared to be a "taking." Since what would be condemned in these borderline 
cases if a literal taking were to occur would be a less-than-fee interest in the 
burdened parcel, non-dollar compensation in the form of " special benefits" 
could be used to offset amounts due the condemnee both for the less-than-fee 
interest taken and for any damages to the parcel remaining.77 As to the other 
two factors, nothing short of a fundamental transformation of prevailing atti­
tudes will overcome them as obstacles to acceptance of the non-dollar com­
pensation position advanced here. A measure of the persistence of these fac­
tors is the tenor of the "taking" debate itself, in which the contending sides 
pay little heed to resolution through economic trade-offs leveraged on govern­
ment's role as initiator and allocator of development opportunities, but urge 
instead the harsh extremes outlined earlier. Until the fiscal side of the public 
governance coin enjoys the attention that so far has been monopolized by its 
physical development side, the debate will remain barren, and the abuses 
cloaked by the present one-dimensional perception of public governance will 
continue to fester.78 
The issue of whether or not just compensation must be paid in dollars 
has been ventilated most frequently in the partial taking context adverted to 
above. If the parcel remaining increases in value as a result of the public 
improvement that necessitated the taking, may government deduct this incre­
ment from the compensation otherwise payable for the portion taken ? This 
question arose in 1897 in Bauman v. Ross,79 the leading U.S.  Supreme Court 
opinion on partial takings. In Bauman, a federal statute that authorized such 
a set-off had been invalidated below on the ground, inter alia, that it "at­
tempted to pay for [the parcel taken] partly in future and contingent benefits, 
and failed to provide for the just compensation required by the Constitution 
to be made."80 Reversing the lower court decision, the Supreme Court an­
nounced that " [ t] he Constitution of the United States contains no express 
prohibition against considering benefits in estimating the just compensation 
to be paid for private property taken for the public use ; and . . . no such 
prohibition can be implied."81 The Court carefully emphasized that to qualify 
for set-off, the benefits conferred must be "capable of present estimate and 
77. Se� text accompanying notes 84-88 infra. 78. This thought is replicated in R. W. G. Bryant's comment that : 
· · · some. arrangeme:it [must be made] whereby public authorities can decide the .use of this or that piece <?f land, from high-rise offices to greenbelt, without having to worry about financial consequences either to the owner or the public purse. 
�· �· �· BRYANT, supra note 45 at 752. See also Costonis Development Rights Transfer : 
T
nad.xp wa_tdfytfstsay, &? YALE L.J. 75, 75-87, 95-103 c l973) ; Hagman A New Deal : r ing in. a � or Wipeouts, 40 PLANNING 9 ( No. 8, 1974) ; ·Wexler 
'
Betterment Re-��:;�� 19f1(1f973)� Proposal for Sounder Land Use Management, 3 y Ar,'E REV. L. & Soc. 
79. 167 U. S. 548 (1897) . 
80. Id. at 562. 
81 .  Id. at 584 ( emphasis added) .  
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reasonable computation,"82 since its reason for sustaining .non-dollar compen­
sation was that the property owner should be no worse off after condemna­
tion than he was before. In Bauman, the Court approved the set-off of 
"special benefits"-those enjoyed principally by the condemnee-against the 
parcel taken. Twenty-one years later, the Court enlarged the Bauman prin­
ciple by holding that "general benefits"-described by the Court as "common 
to all property in the vicinity"-may also be set off.83 
State courts, in contrast, have generally taken a much harder line on 
the set-off issue.84 In some states, benefits cannot be set off at all.85 I n  most, 
special, but not general, benefits may be set off.86 Special benefits, moreover, 
typically cannot be set off against -land of the condemnee not physically con­
tiguous to the parcel taken.87 And in many j urisdictions, they may not be 
set off against the compensation payable for the parcel taken-even though 
their value clearly exceeds damages to the remainder. 88 Not surprisingly, state 
courts have also proclaimed equally strong prohibitions against non-dollar 
compensation in other eminent domain contexts-for example, where gov­
ernment attempted to compensate in bonds89 o r  with substitute land.90 
The state court opinions, most of which are of 19th or early 20th Cen­
tury vintage, evidence that period's bias toward private rights. They express 
the judiciary's unwillingness to permit government to recoup the increase 
in land values that it creates through its public projects--despite the obvious 
windfalls that accrue thereby to private landowners. They are suffused, more­
over, with the fear that non-dollar compensation will prove illusory or will 
be exaggerated by condemnation juries anxious to keep awards low. Yet, 
benefit assessment programs for such public improvements as streets, sewers, 
and the like are universally sustained.91 Surely it is no easier to compute in­
creased land values in the benefit assessment context than in the partial taking 
context. And contrary to the courts' apprehension about the niggardliness of 
82. Id. 
83. McCoy v. Union Elevated R.R. Co., 247 U.S. 354 ( 1918) . No partial taking had 
occurred in McCoy, which dealt instead with the issue of whether dollar compensation 
was due abutting landowners whose property had allegedly been damaged by . the con­
struction of an elevated railway. 
84. On the subject of special benefits generally, see 1 0RGEL, supra note 71, ch. l, 
§ 7 ;  3 P. NICHOLS, THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN ch. 8, § 8.6205 (Sackman ed. 1973 ) ; 
Bishop, Enhancement Can Save Tax Dollars, 1973 PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON 
PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN LAW 313  ( Southwestern Legal Foundation ) .  
85. See, e.g., Finley v. Board of County Comm'rs, 291 P.2d 333 (Okla. 195 5 ) .  
86. See, e.g., Department of Public Works v. Divit, 2 5  Ill. 2d 93, 182 N.E.2d 749 
( 1962) ; State v. Bailey, 212  Ore. 261 , 319 P.2d 906 ( 1957).  
87. See, e.g., Department of Public Works v. Fair, 229 Cal. App. 2d 801, 40 Cal. 
Rptr. 644 ( 1964) ; Celeste v. State, 56 Misc. 2d 991, 290 N.Y.S.2d 64 ( Ct. Cl. 1968) , 
afj'd, 40 App. Div. 880, 337 N.Y.S.2d 252 ( 1972) . 
88. See, e.g., Department of Public Works v. Home Trust Investment Co., 8 Cal. 
App. 3d 1022, 87 Cal. Rptr. 722 ( 1970) ; Department of Public Works v. Morse, 3 Ill. 
App. 3d 721, 279 N.E.2d 150 ( 1972 ) .  
89. See, e.g., Gardiner v. Henderson, 103 Ariz. 420, 443 P.2d 416 (1968). 
90. See, e.g., North Carolina State Highway Comm'n v. Farm Equipment Co., 281 
N.C. 459, 189 S.E.2d 272 ( 1972 ) .  
91. See P. NICHOLS, 1 THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.6209 (Sackman ed. 1973 ) .  
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condemnation j uries, their disposition unquestionably has been to favor their 
fellow citizens with inflated awards, not to mulct them.92 
2. Just Compensation and the Highest and Best Use Standard. The 
divergent attitudes of the federal and state courts are also reflected in their 
quite different regard for the highest and best use standard as the measure 
of just compensation. Defined as the price a willing buyer would pay to a 
willing seller in the private market, that standard invites serious problems 
where market forces and public regulation are deeply entwined. Refusing to 
make a "fetish . . .  of market value,"93 the U.S.  Supreme Court has repeat­
edly questioned the adequacy of that standard in such instances.94 In United 
States v. Commodities Trading Corp.,95 for example, the question posed was 
whether the j ust compensation requirement precluded the federnl government 
from paying an Office of Price Administration "ceiling price" rather than an 
allegedly higher market price for a quantity of pepper requisitioned by the 
War Department in 1944. Noting the complexities introduced by public regu­
lation, the Court commented : 
This Court has never attempted to prescribe a rigid rule for 
determining what is "j ust compensation" under all circumstances 
and in all cases. Fair market value has normally been accepted as a 
just standard. But when market value has been too difficult to find, 
or when its application would result in manifest injustice to owner 
or public, courts have fashioned and applied other standards. Since 
the market value standard was developed in the context of a market 
largely free from governmental controls, prices rigidly fi xed by law 
raise questions concerning whether a "market value" so fixed can 
be a measure of "just compensation."96 
Prior to the Supreme Court' s 1926 decision of Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co.,97 state courts rarely encountered similar complexities in applying the 
highest and best use standard when government condemned land. Because 
private land values in those days were seldom the subject of deliberate aug­
mentation or diminution by public regulation, government wore only one 
hat-that of condemnor-and the fiction of analogizing it to a private buyer 
paying a market price made tolerable sense. But Euclid bestowed a second 
hat on government-that of land value regulator-by expanding governmental 
power in two fundamental respects.  First it permitted government, within 
broad constitutional limits, to allocate development potential to private lands 
based on community goals as reflected in public governance measures ;98 
92. See 2 0RGEL, supra note 71 at § 247 93. United States. v. Cors, 337 'u.s. 325: 332 ( 1949) . . 94. See, e.g., Umted States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 12 1  ( 1950) ;  Untt9t
. 
��a�eU�S.cIZls, (;g5�
·�· 325 ( 1949) ; United States v. Miller, 3 1 7  u.s. 369 ( 1943) .  
96. Id. at 123. 
97. 272 U.S. 365. 
98. Id. at 389, 390. 
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second, it ruled that the resulting dollar value of land so regulated need not 
approximate-and indeed may fall drastically below-its value in an unreg­
ulated market.99 From that time on, condemned private land has not differed 
from the War Department's requisitioned pepper with respect to its valua­
tion for eminent domain purposes. 
This seeming anomaly has caused the state courts no end of trouble. They 
have yet to grasp Euclid's full implications-in large measure because they, 
like eminent domain commentators, 100 continue to view zoning and other 
forms of public governance as alien intrusions into the realm of land value 
appraisal. Appreciation of the anomaly's roots could have provided the courts 
with a basis for transforming the eminent domain power into a realistic tool 
for dealing with overly stringent regulation. Given the Bauman holding and 
the recognition in Euclid that within ample constitutional limits government 
may legitimately regulate private land's development potential and therefore 
its "market" value, the courts might have reformulated eminent domain doc­
trine in two respects.  I n  place of the highest and best use standard, they 
might have allowed as compensation only that value increment necessary to 
cure the taking objection. And they might have broadened acceptable means 
of compensation to include, in addition to dollars, marketworthy development 
opportunities. 
Shortsighted concern for private rights has not only barred this outcome 
but has insured that Euclid's erosion of the highest and best use standard 
would be narrowly interpreted. True, state courts today do give weight to 
the impact of public governance on private land value.101 But they have coun­
tered with two exceptions that undo much of Euclid's force. First, the valu­
ation formula now applied takes as its measure the condemned parcel's "high­
est and best use under existin_g or reasonably probable land use controls." 
As construed, the italicized phrase undercuts public governance as a valua­
tion constraint because it requires that the award include both the land's value 
under existing land use restrictions and the premium that the market places 
on it in anticipation of future zoning changes that will increase its value.102 
99. According to Professor Ellickson's calculations,  the zoning restrictions in Euclid 
reduced the value of the plaintiff's property from $870,000 to $540,000. See A lternatives, 
supra note 18,  at 700 n.68. 
100. It is startling, for example, to find in the index of Orgel's two-volume eminent 
domain treatise, 0RGEL, supra note 71, only four references to zoning, two of which refer 
to footnotes in the main work and two to textual passages of less than a paragraph's 
duration. 
101.  Land use controls, if validly enacted and applied, do afford the basis upon which 
a condemned parcel's valuation is calculated-except where the valuation formula allows 
for "a reasonable probability of change," as noted in the text. See City of Beverly Hills 
v. Anger, 127 Cal. App. 223, 15 P.2d 867 (3d Dist. 1932) ; see generally Zipser, Zomng 
Classification and Eminent Domain, 1 URBAN LAWYER 89, 90 ( 1969) ; Sackman, The 
Impact of Zoning and Eminent Domain Upon Each Other, 1970 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
INSTITUTE ON PLANNING, ZONING AND EMINENT DOMAIN 107, 124 (Southwestern Legal 
Foundation ) .  
102. See Zipser, supra note 101, a t  90 ;  Sackman, supra note 101, at 125-26. 
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That this premium, which is solely the product of public action,103 should be 
deemed an increment of the "private" land's value is a throwback to earlier 
times. The exception on which it is founded, moreover, offers a field day for 
inventive counsel, for sympathetic condemnation jurors, and for judges who, 
in the words of one of their number, see themselves as "Hector [s]  at the 
bridge . . . defend [ ing] the individual from the onslaughts of society ."104 
Further, the exception is not even symmetrically applied : under it, the con­
demnee receives a windfall for prospective upzoning, but his award is not 
discounted when, instead, downzoning is imminent.105 
Second, courts frequently ignore land use controls in determining value 
when these controls are imposed prior to condemnation of the fee or of a 
lesser interest in the parcel.106 This result is unobj ectionable if the condemn­
ing authority intended all along to appropriate the land for its own use and 
imposed the restriction merely as a sham to depress the condemnation award. 
But this is not the pattern that, I believe, will occur with increasing frequency 
in resource protection and related contexts.107 That pattern is likely to in­
clude two and, possibly, three elements. First, government severely down­
zones land because market pressures, stimulated by the land's presently gen­
erous zoning, threaten a resource, such as an urban landmark or an eco­
logical preserve .  Then, to mitigate the downzoning's economic impact, and 
in return for proper assurances safeguarding the resource, government extends 
103. For rare judicial acknowledgment of this reality, see City of Miami Beach v. 
Hogan, 63 So. 2d 493 ( Fla. ) ,  cert. denied, 346 U.S. 819 ( 1953 ) ,  in which the court 
rej ecte� a collateral attack on the low density zoning applicable to the condemnee's parcel, 
observmg that, were the attack to succeed, "the city will be compelled to pay the in­
creased value brought about by rezoning . . . . " Id. at 495. Cf. United States v. Miller, 
317  U.S. 369 ( 1943) (refusing to include in a condemnation award value increments re­
sulting from the public improvement necessitating the condemnation on the ground that 
" [t ]he owners ought not to gain by speculating on probable increase in value due to the 
Government's activities." Id. at 377 ) .  
More representative of judicial attitudes i s  Levin v .  State of New York, 17 App. Div. 
2d 335, �34 N._Y.S.2d 481 ( 1962) ,  af]'d, 13 N .Y.2d 87, 192 N.E.2d 155, 242 N.Y.S.2d 193 
( 19�3) ,  m which the condemnee on October 6, 1954, purchased a parcel zoned for resi­
dential use for $3,500 per a�re ; succeeded in having it upzoned to light industrial use 
on Octa.her 26, 1 954 ; too� tltl_e on December I ,  1 954, entering into a net lease with an electronics fir'!l under which 1t :vas to construct a facility for the latter ; and suffered the cc;mdemnation of .21 acres of its parcel on December 31, 1954. Sustaining an eminent doma111 award t�at mcreased t?e value of the acreage condemned by some $18,000 per acre for a total mcremen�al gam of $378,000, the court commented : !�� fact that cla11?1ants stood to make a handsome profit from their favorable acqu.mtion of the subject property and subsequent favorable lease to [the elec­tronics firm) shout? not deprive claimants of the rewards of a successful busi­ness. enterprise, which was lost because of the appropriation 
f,d . . at 3�7, �34 N.X. S.2d at �83. Levin's moral is clear : gove�nment must pay for the private gams that its regulation fosters. 
V 
104. Young, The Role of the fudge in a Condemnation Proceeding in REAL ESTATE 
H
������N s:�
ie
�o��Ml����6
9
)
�83, 695-96 (PLI Real Estate Law & Practice Course 
105. See, e.g., Remdollar v. Kaiser, 195 Md. 314, 73 A.2d 493 ( 1950) 106. See, e.g., Robertson v. City of Salem 191 F. Supp 604 (D · 0 1961 ) . Galt v
t
. 
9
C
3
ook
S 
C
k
ounty, 405 Ill. 396, 91 N.E.2d 395 ( 1950 ) .  See gene�ally Zip�er 
r
�pra note 101 a ; ac man, supra note 101, at 124. ' ' 
107. See text accompanying notes 168-210, 216-22 infra. 
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to the landowner a compensatory supplement which-though worth less than 
the drop in the land's value as a result of downzoning-does afford him a 
reasonable return when considered in conjunction with the return he enjoys 
from the land's present use. Finally, instead of dollars, the supplement might 
be in kind, including, for example, a governmentally protected, limited-use 
monopoly108 or, perhaps, an authorization to transfer the regulated land's 
development rights to non-sensitive locations elsewhere.109 
This approach could backfire in light of eminent domain's doctrinal bars 
against non-dollar compensation and prior downzoning. Indeed, the conscien­
tiouS' regulatory authority virtually invites this Catch-22 result because, in 
extending the compensatory supplement, it effectively acknowledges the im­
plausibility of the police power as the sole basis for its program. Mesmerized 
by the correlatives model, the courts might well force the authority to the 
eminent domain extreme,110 with its requirement of dollar compensation fig­
ured on the parcel's highest and best use under the prior generous zoning 
plus such additional zoning increments as are deemed "reasonably probable." 
Is it any wonder that public officials-alarmed by this vicious legal version 
of Russian Roulette--have little incentive to try to meet injured landowners 
half-way, but choose instead either not to regulate at all or to camouflage the 
measure in police power trappings and take their chances in court ? 
C. The No-Win Outcome of the Police Power/Eminent Domain Deadlock 
Were the Man from Mars to swoop over the cratered battlefield of land 
use, what he might need most to appreciate the struggle is not legal acuity, 
but a strong sense of irony. For it is a struggle in which victories are pyrrhic 
and losers count themselves winners. It swirls in a void where . public gov­
ernance systems, because they pay little heed to their private impacts, win 
a battle or two, and then are undone. In their plight, these regulatory systems 
resemble the description Buckminster Fuller once gave of the world : an oc­
topus constantly stepping on itself .111 The void in which they swirl is perhaps 
American land use law's most characteristic feature ; it is certainly its most self­
defeating one. 
1 .  The Real Estate Community and the Environmentalists. The real 
estate community, heartened by the pervasive bias of eminent domain doc­
trine for private rights, ritualistically proclaims that formal eminent · domain 
proceedings alone are an acceptable curative for stringent land use controls. 
108. See text accompanying notes 155-67 infra. 
109. See text accompanying notes 168-72 infra. 
110. See Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d 
762 ( Sup. Ct. 1973 ) ,  afj'd 47 App. Div. 2d 715 ( 1 975 ) ,  discussed in text accompanying 
notes 195-210 infra; cf. Parker v. Commonwealth, 1 78 Mass. 199, 59 N.E. 634 ( 1901 ) ,  
discussed in text accompanying notes 233-50 infra ; Bissel v. Town of Bethel, 1 13 Conn. 
323, 155 A. 232 ( 193 1 ) .  · 
1 1 1 .  As quoted by Jonathan Barnett in an Address on Law, Development and His­
toric Preservation, given at the Columbia ( N.Y. ) International Center, Apr. 23, 1975. 
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It seems unable to understand that its hard-line position v
irtually �arantees 
. . "d d · of the pohce powe
r. 
the very result it wishes to avoi -untowar expansion . 
The interests of that community and of rational land use 
p ractice
_ 
generall
_
y 
would be better served if its members continued their drumfi.re
 against unfaJT 
uses of the police power but, at the same time, lent their support _
to a search 
for intermediate compensatory formats .  I n  doing so, they would d
isco-:er tl�at 
they are not a monolithic bloc. The interests of developers often confl�ct w
ith 
those of landowners. Windfalls accruing to the latter are translated mto the 
often exorbitant prices that developers must pay for land, driving up their 
enterprise and financing costs and, ultimately, the price to their customers. 
Some heavy intramural jostling is long overdue about this i ndefensible out­
come.112 
Imbalance also flaws the rhetoric of supporters of strong resource pro­
tection programs. Mistakenly, in my j u dgment, they view as an unmixed 
blessing the sweeping expansion of the police power recorded in occasional 
judicial decisions.113 But the lasting impact of these decisions is threatened 
by the fierce political backlash they actuate among such formidable private 
groups as the real estate community.114 This reaction, it must be underlined, 
1s not wholly devoid of ethical or policy merit.1H> Moreover, it is one thing 
1 12. Some movement in this direction has already occurred. Over 15  years ago, 
HousE AND HoME, the trade organ of the house builders industry, strongly endorsed 
windfall recoupment by government, recognizing that it would lower the price that devel­
opers must pay for land, thereby lowering the price of housing for the ultimate customer. 
See 18 HousE AND HoME, Aug. 1960 passim. Unfortunately, the industry has not since 
systematically urged this hopeful · initiative. 
113. See, e.g., Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 
1972) ; Candlestick Properties, Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conserv. & Dev. Comm'n, 11  
Cal. App. 3d 557, 89 Cal. Rptr. 897 ( 1970 ) ; Just v.  Marinette County, 56 Wis. 2d 7,  201 
N.W.2d 761 ( 1972 ) .  
1 �4. _The opposition o f  real estate and financial interests, for example, has been in­
fluential m blocking Congressional efforts since 1972 to adopt national land use legislation. 
For an account of the demise of the most recent ( 1 975) national land use bill see N.Y. 
Times, July 16, 1975, at 15, col. 4. 
' 
. 1 15. For instance, Steel �ill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton, 469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972 ) ,  a ce!ebrate? favorite of the police power enthusiasts, is something less than 
a paragon of fair Pll:b�1c governance, . as revealed by Professor Delogu's scathing attack on the follow-up dec1s10n to Steel Hill, abstracted in 27 LAND USE AND ZONING DIGEST 
1 ( No. l ,  1974) (barring on res judicata grounds the same developer's challenge to the 
town's land use regime) .  See Delogu, Steel Hill Development Incorporated v. Town of Sanbornton, 27 L�N_D ?SE & Zo�ING DIGEST 6-_7 ( No. 3, 1 975 ) .  Among the abuses shel­tered �y that dec1s1on s percept10n of the pohce power, Professor Delogu details the following : 
. _Aside from the injustice to plaintiff, who has now been rebuffed three times 
m. his . effort to develop land which he owns in the town of Sanbornton the real m�sch1ef of the pr:esent holding is its capacity to encourage continued �nd wider m1�use of the pohce power. Towns and environmental extremists will be led to believe th0;t unwa1�ted development can be frozen out indefinitely by legislating !arge lot size re9mrements [the town, which occupies 25 square miles had zoned itself almost ef!t1rely for 3- and 6-acre minimum lot sizes, supposedly for environ­�ental protect�on reasons ] ; that pr�sumption� of validity are impenetrable bar­riers-a �u�st.1tute for _comprehensive plannmg ; that exclusions are erha s tolerable if 1t 1s only trailers [called for in the developer's ame d d I! p quest] fng deco�d 
h
homes [called for. in his i_nitial development 
n 
a�pli���i��Jg th�� are exc u e an t e town votes for 1t ; that mterim or stop-gap measures can be 
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to score occasional dramatic victories in the courts ; it is another to implement 
resource protection programs that are sufficiently responsive to the legitimate 
concerns of all affected groups to serve as a durable foundation for successful 
public governance. Enough has been said earlier116 to raise grave doubts as 
to whether the police power, unaided by reasonable compensatory alternatives, 
can provide this foundation. 
2. The Courts. Sympathy coupled with a sense of irony is appropriate 
in assessing the performance of the courts, upon which the brunt of the public 
governance/private rights struggle has improperly fallen. They now suffer 
from an advanced case of doctrinal schizophrenia. When presiding over emi­
nent domain proceedings, they brim with confidence, comfortable in their role 
as guardians of constitutional rights and as interpreters ( if not authors) of 
the rules that govern these rights. But when they are called upon to adj udicate 
the constitutionality of stringent land use measures, confidence evaporates and 
erratic opinions lacking in cogent or consistent reasoning abound. St. George 
was an odds-on favorite in his battle compared to the courts, with few re­
sources of their own to handle the economic-appraisal issues that complicate 
these legal challenges, with scant guidance from the legislatures, and without 
a secure societal consensus about which economic expectancies are the land­
owner's and which the government's. 
Doctrinal schizophrenia shows up in the courts' willingness to permit 
eminent domain doctrines to ossify in order to protect private rights, while 
simultaneously widening the police power to effectuate the public interest in 
resource protection. Logically, one would have assumed that economic expec­
tancies in land merit the same degree of protection whether threatened by 
government's exercise of its eminent domain or of its police power. In fact, 
the courts have employed a double standard. Exemplifying their desire to 
have it both ways are two recent Wisconsin Supreme Court opinions. The 
first, Just v. Marinette County,117 sustained as a proper exercise of the police 
power a "Shorelands Conservancy District" designation that essentially pre­
cluded Mr. Just from improving his lakeside site, even for personal use. No 
amateur in doctrinal sleight-of-hand, the court rested its result on the orac­
ular pronouncement that "it is not an unreasonable exercise of [the police] 
power to prevent harm to public rights by limiting the use of private property 
to its natural uses."118 Yet two years before, in Luber v. Milwaukee County,119 
the same court invalidated a Wisconsin eminent domain statute that denied 
extended indefinitely by procedural devices which foreclose reexamination of 
initial, tentative, or inconclusive findings. 
Id. at 7. 
For a different view of another favorite of the enthusiasts, Just v. Marinette County, 
56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 ( 1972) ,  see text accompanying notes 1 17-120 infra. 
1 16. See text accompanying notes 10-14 supra. 
1 17. 56 Wis. 2d 7, 201 N.W.2d 761 ( 1972 ) .  
1 18. Id. at 17, 201 N.W.2d at 768. 
1 19. 47 Wis. 2d 271, 177 N.W.2d 380 ( 1970).  
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compensation for rental losses suffered by the condemnee a year or more 
before the taking. Overruling its own precedents and departing from the �reat 
majority of its sister state courts, the Wisconsin court further enlarged pnvate 
rights in the context of eminent domain by declaring as a constitutional ne­
cessity that compensation awards must include an increment both for conse­
quential damages, such as the rental losses in Luber, and for the condemned 
property's fair market value.120 With lust and Luber in the books, one can­
not help but wonder how the Wisconsin court would define the compensation 
a public agency would have to pay if it condemned an ecologically sensitive 
site which was also ideally situated for development as a regional shopping 
center. 
What is especially ironic about the contradictory evolution of eminent 
domain and police power doctrine is that judicial excesses in one make in­
evitable off-setting distortions in the other. A s  noted earlier, the courts appre­
ciate that financially pressed government cannot found public governance on 
the eminent domain power, and they are properly solicitous of the need for 
strong controls i n  resource protection and similar contexts.  Having painted 
themselves-and government planning authorities-into a corner by sponsor­
ing harsh eminent domain rules, they have little choice but to sanction the 
police power's lopsided expansion when resource protection schemes are chal­
lenged as takings. 
3.  The Legislatures. Properly skeptical of the courts' ability alone to 
master the compensation problem, 9ther commentators121 have rightly coun­
seled a more active role for the legislatures. But the legislatures have not been 
li stening. They have done little to revise eminent domain doctrines to meet 
modern needs. They have enacted ambitious regulatory programs that either 
ignore the programs' economic impacts122 or, equally futilely, ordain recourse 
to formal eminent domain proceedings to save the programs if they are deemed 
confiscatory on j udicial examination.123 With a few striking exceptions noted 
below,1 24 they have not devised intermediate compensatory formats. Most dis­
tressingly, they do not appreciate that theirs is the institution best fitted to 
address the compensation problem in a balanced and thorough manner. How­
ever unwisely, the National Association of Homebuilders can be expected to 
push 1 9th Century nostrums and the Conservation Foundation broad police 
power solutions ; one does not denigrate either group i n  observing that they 
are, after all ,  special pleaders for particular i nterests. The courts have prob-
1 20. ld. at 283. 177 N.W.2d at 386. 
1 ; 1 .  Sec, l' . .<J. , Michelman, supra_ note 1 7, at 1248-57 ; Sax, supra note 6, at 175. L2. Sa, 1' • .'J.,  LA. REv. STAT. tit 56, ch. 8, §§ 1 84 1  c t  seq. ( 1975 )  · IowA CODE ANN ch. 1 08a. §§ l08A. l r t  seq. ( 1975 ) .  ' 
· 
0
97���· Sl'i', r.y., MAS S . GEN. LAWS ch. 130, § 105 ( 1 972 ) ; N .H. REv. STAT. § 483-A 
1 24. S,·.- text accompanying notes 145-53 infra ( "Ramapo Plan" ) · t t · 
. - 19- 210 · f 
' , ex accompany-ing notes :>- rn ra ( Tudor Parks transferable development rights program ) .  
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ably done about as well as could be expected, but they obviously cannot handle 
the task by themselves. In the last analysis, it is the job of legislatures to 
hear the claims of competing groups and to accommodate their legitimate 
interests as fully as possible within a normative framework understandable 
both to these groups and to reviewing courts. Ultimately, it is their job to 
take the leading role in forging a value consensus concerning the entitlements 
of land ownership in 20th Century America. Their failure to get on with the 
job is the root cause of the nation's taking quandary. 
III.  THE AccoMMODATION POWER 
Express recognition of the accommodation power could prove a potent 
aid in untangling the compensation conundrum. The power would j oin with, 
but not displace, the police and eminent domain powers as a regulatory tool. 
Hence, accommodation would be unnecessary where government's pursuit of 
health, safety and general welfare goals does not unfairly impinge on prop­
erty owners. Nor is it appropriate when government acquires private land 
outright.125 But accommodation ought to be government's responsibility in the 
borderline cases, exemplified by the facts in Just, where fair compensation 
for burdened landowners would seem an ethical imperative. 
How might legislatures define the borderline case when considering the 
adoption of strict regulatory programs, and how might courts define it when 
called upon to review private challenges to them ? The lesson of a half-century 
of judicial wrestling with this problem is that it admits to no simple answer. 
Prior experience does teach, however, that it has both a substanti.ve dimension 
-at what point do regulatory incursions on private land's development poten­
tial "go too far" to be sustained under the police power ?-and an institutional 
dimension-what are the respective roles of legislatures, courts and admin­
istrative bodies in fixing� that point and in assuring fair compensation when 
it is exceeded ? Implicit in past experience also is embryonic judicial and 
legislative recognition of the accommodation power. Each of these topics is 
addressed in the paragraphs that follow. 
A. The Spectrum of Land Use Intensity : A Framework for A nalysis 
One way to define the accommodation power's scope is to establish a 
framework that fixes the varying levels of a private parcel's development po-
125. While the eminent domain rules alluded to in text ought, in my judgment, to be 
reformulated to reflect a sounder balance between private property rights and public 
governance interests, more secure protection than the accommodation power affords is 
warranted when government directly expropriates private land. It should, perhaps, also 
be stressed that it is not the purpose of this article to assail all eminent domain rules as 
biased toward private rights, but only those rules singled out in text. As Professor Michel­
man convincingly argues, other eminent domain rules, such as those barring compensa­
tion for relocation expenses, unduly favor the government as condemnor, and warrant 
liberalization through legislative action. See Michelman, supra note 17, passim. 
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tential in terms of familiar land use and eminent domain categories. Recasting 
the facts in Just, for example, a spectrum of these intensities for a parcel 
within the Shorelands Conservancy District might appear as follows : 
� SPECTRUM OF LAND USE INTEN SITY 
-< ....... 
E-< 
z INTENSITY INDEX U S E  VALUE � 
E-< 
0 
ii. 
Highest and Best Use Unre- Hotel $4,000,000 E-< stricted by Public Regulation z � 
:21 
Single Family Housing, 10 $1,000,000 ii. Allowable Use 0 Dwelling Units/ Acre � 
� 
> 
� Reasonable Beneficial Use Single Family Housing, 2 $ 200,000 0 Dwelling Units/ Acre (!) 
z 
....... 
CJ) Resource Protection Use Shorelands Conservancy -$ 75,000 -< 
� ( Acquacultural Uses Only ) 
� 
u 
z 
Zero Intensity Use None -$ 50,000 ....... 
The first and last categories, Highest and Best Use Unrestricted by 
Public Regulation and Zero Intensity Use, need little explanation. The former, 
reminiscent of the pre.:.Euclid highest and best use standard, is  simply the use 
promising the greatest dollar return from an unregulated parcel. The latter 
allows no use at all and is represented above as having a negative return 
because the owner must nevertheless pay real estate tax and other carrying 
costs that are incident to land ownership. No one today, except perhaps the 
private marketeers, seriously urges that landowners enjoy a legal entitlement 
to the first category. And, excluding some difficult-to-conceive situations in 
which all possible uses of a private parcel would result in proscribable harms, 
only the most rabid of police power enthusiasts would insist that government 
is free to deprive a property owner of the entire development potential of his 
land without affording him some compensatory relief. 
The Resource Protection Use category is exemplified by the Shorelands 
Conservancy designation in Just-that is, tight land use controls, typically 
adopted to protect natural and man-made environmental amenities. But two 
qualifications are necessary here. First, this category is  plotted below the 
Reasonable Beneficial Use category on the . foregoing chart only for illustra­
tive purposes ; in some circumstances, resource p rotection control could permit 
a greater economic return than that possible under Reasonable Beneficial Use 
controls. A negative value is assigned to the Resource Protection Use cate­
gory on the chart to reflect not only the p rivate land's carrying costs but 
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also possible additional costs that might have to be absorbed to adapt the 
land for the uses permitted under the Conservancy designation.126 Second, 
this category may apply to measures serving such ends as growth manage­
ment, nonconforming use amortization or airport zoning, which are environ­
mental only in the broadest sense. 
The Allowable Use category denotes a level of development potential that 
is substantially more liberal than necessary to prevail against a confiscation 
challenge. It is, in fact, the category under which the vast majority of private 
land is zoned in America today. Accordingly, it usually corresponds to what, 
in eminent domain terminology, is the standard of "highest and best use under 
existing land use controls." If, in addition, the condemnee succeed s  in dem­
onstrating that liberalization of land use controls affecting his parcel is "rea­
sonably probable," the further increment of development potential will fall 
somewhere between the Allowable Use and the Highest and Best Use Un­
restricted by Public Regulation categories. 
Though last discussed, the Reasonable Beneficial Use category127 ranks 
first in importance because it defines the borderline between measures that 
are sustainable under the police power and those which must be predicated 
on the accommodation power. As such, this category refers to an intensity 
of development potential which affords a sufficient economic return on pri­
vate land to escape invalidation on confiscation grounds. It is premised on 
the only generalization that can be confidently extrapolated from the welter 
of confiscation precedents:  namely, that land use controls can bar a parcel's 
most profitable use or even uses of lesser profitability without being confis­
catory if they allow the landowner a reasonable economic return or, under 
the label used here, a Reasonable Beneficial Use.128 
Land use controls may be enacted under the police power if they permit 
an intensity of use that equals or is greater than that prescribed b y  the Rea-
126. The "negative value" concept has been expressly recognized by the Wisconsin 
Supreme Court, author of the Just opinion, which, in Kmiec v. Town of Spider Lake, 60 
Wis. 2d 640, 211  N.W.2d 471 ( 1 973 ),  invalidated as confiscatory the designation of a 
landowner's parcel as Agricultural on the ground, inter alia, that the parcel would have 
a "negative value" if the landowner were forced to absorb the costs of adapting it for 
agricultural uses. See id. at 652, 21 1 N.W.2d at 477. 
127. Readers familiar with English planning and compensation law will note the 
similarity between the Reasonable Beneficial Use category used in text and the criterion 
of capability of "reasonably beneficial use" found in England's Town and Country Plan­
ning Act of 1971, ch. 78, § 180. For a discussion of that criterion's function in English 
planning and compensation practice, see TAKING, supra note 5, at 268-75. 
128. With few, if any, exceptions, none of the numerous cases labeled as "new mood" 
opinions in THE TAKING IssuE support the proposition that "a regulation of the use of 
land, if reasonably related to a valid public purpose, can never constitute a taking." 
TAKING, supra note 5, at 238. What they do support is the generalization that the eco­
nomic return possible under public governance may deviate substantially from that pos­
sible in an unregulated market, provided that the former return does not fall below a 
Reasonable Beneficial Use standard. Even Just, which illustrates the outer range of the 
new mood opinions, does not reject that standard as the determinant of confiscation, but 
instead offers a novel interpretation of it-namely, that it may be calculated on the basis 
of an ecologically sensitive parcel's natural rather than improved uses. 
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sonable Beneficial Use level. If the permitted intensity is less than this, gov­
ernment must then employ the accommodation power. Accordingly, as the 
chart above is structured, the accommodation power-rather than the police 
power-would b e  the proper tool in the Resource Protection category because 
the economic return possible under it falls below that plotted for the parcel's 
Reasonable Beneficial Use. When such discrepancies occur, government would 
have two options. If it lacks the wherewithal to provide fair compensation, 
it must liberalize the challenged restriction. But, in doing so, it need allocate 
only enough additional density to satisfy the Reasonable Beneficial Use Stan­
dard. If it possesses the resources and wishes to save the defective measure, 
it must provide fair compensation. 
Fair compensation under the accommodation power differs from the 
eminent domain power's just compensation in three basic respects. First, its 
measure is the difference between the parcel's economic return under the 
challenged restriction and under the Reasonable Beneficial Use standard ; for 
just compensation, the relevant measure would be the difference between the 
return under the regulation and the return possible under the Allowable Use 
category or-through manipulation of the "reasonable probability" exception 
-under an even higher level. Second, fair compensation may take the form 
of any marketworthy alternative, whether or not monetary ; just compensa­
tion, on the other hand, would probably have to be in dollars .  Finally, pro­
cedures for the award of fair compensation can be streamlined by eliminating 
such features as the condemnation j ury and the bifurcated system, currently 
existing, 129 that requires an initial declaratory action to determine whether a 
regulatory measure is a "taking" and then a formal eminent domain proceed­
ing to fix the requisite compensation. 130 
So far, nothing has been said about how the Reasonable Beneficial Use 
standard is to b e  fixed in specific instances. What i s  a constitutional rate of 
return, for example, on an urban landmark building in a booming or depressed 
construction market or on prime agricultural land or an ecologically sensitive 
site in the path of or remote from imminent urbanization ? The omission is 
deliberate. This article's goal is to clarify the currently misconceived treatment 
of the "taking issue" so-called, not to prescribe concrete rules for determin­
ing when, in specific cases, regulation deprives a landowner of a Reasonable 
Beneficial Use return. 
129. For examples of statutes expressly incorporating this bifurcation see note 123 supra. ' 
13� . . The distinctions between "fair" and "just" compensation demonstrate that statutes author1Z1�1g local governments to zo'?e through the eminent domain power, see text ac­co.mpanymg note 56 supra, are pure instances of eminent domain, not, as Kansas City v. fmdl.e, 446 S.V\:'.2d 807, 813. (Mo. 1969) st<l:tes, a "blending of the two powers (eminent omam and police power ) m the sa�e legislative enactment." The compensation man­dated �Y these sta.tutes must accord with _the procedural and substantive requirements of the emment .domam power rat�er than _with those identified in text as pertaining to the �cco�m�atlon �,ower. <;:on,�us1?n on t�1s I?oint is simply another illustration of the mis-1dent1ficahon of regulation with the police power." See text acco · t 52-67 supra. mpanymg no es 
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It is my belief that, up to now, we have behaved regarding the taking 
question very much like Lewis Carroll's dreamy Alice who, when faced with 
the question whether cats eat bats or, for that matter, whether bats eat cats, 
mistakenly concluded that "as she couldn't answer either question, it didn't 
much matter which way she put it." More important than seeking to "answer" 
the taking question at this stage is determining whether the right question 
is being asked. Because, in my judgment, we have been asking the wrong 
question, we still have little idea what a constitutional rate of return should 
be in the cases posed above. Devising fair responses will be the work of 
legislatures, courts and, to an increasing degree, administrative agencies which 
must begin by getting the question right ; and they must be prepared to revise 
whatever responses seem appropriate for one period in light of shifting com­
munity values later. 
Poaching somewhat on their territory, I would venture five preliminary. 
suggestions. First, the tasks are principally legislative or administrative, with 
the courts playing an essentially supporting role. Their job will be to decide 
whether legislative standards or their application in specific cases comport 
with what Justice Douglas has called "the political ethics reflected in the 
Fifth Amendment."131 Contrary to the fear that this approach will encroach 
on the proper role of the courts, it is my guess that the judiciary will welcome 
being freed from the frustrating task of setting fair rates of return with little 
or no help from these other institutions. 
Second, legislative standards should . be contextually derived. Precise 
quantitative formulae may be fitting in some cases132-as the analogies in the 
rent control and public utility rate-setting fields suggest-while broader qual­
itative standards, which perhaps merely codify the criteria that recur in land 
use decisions, 133 may be the best or most appropriate standards that can be 
offered in others. 
Third, despite the apparent quantitative cast of the Spectrum of Land 
Use Intensity, I envisage a determination of Reasonable Beneficial Use rates 
that will be heavily interlaced with value judgments rooted in community 
standards.134 These determinations, in other words, will rest as much on cul­
tural as on narrower appraisal or technical grounds. 
131. United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 ( 1 949) .  
132. The New York City landmarks ordinance exemplifies a precise quantitative 
standard measuring the Reasonable Beneficial Use level. That ordinance authorizes out­
right denial of a permit for alteration or demolition of landmark buildings which yield 
a "reasonable return" --<lefined as a six per cent return on the assessed valuation of the 
property. See N .Y.C. Admin. Code Ann. ch. 8-A, §§ 207- 1.0, 207-8.0 ( Cum. Supp. 1974-
1975 ) .  The constitutionality of this provision has not yet been tested. 
133. For a similar suggestion, see Van Alstyne, Statutory Modification of In.verse 
Condemnation Criteria : The Scope of Legislative Power, 19 STAN. L. REv. 727, 737-8 
(1967) . This approach is illustrated in a resource protection plan developed by the writer 
and Robert De Voy for use in Puerto Rico. See PUERTO Rico PLAN, supra note 13, 
at 14-16. 
134. For all tl-\e uneasiness that it may cause in some quarters, the significance of the 
cultural element as a determinant of the legal entitlements associated with land ownership 
cannot be overemphasized. See generally R. W. G. BRYANT, LAND : PRIVATE PROPERTY 
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Fourth, use of the accommodation power should increase on
ly modestly135 
the instances in which compensation is required as a co
mplement to regula­
tion. It is not that power's mission to displace the police po
wer or to freeze 
its evolution for all time, but merely to prevent it from ser
ving as a cloak 
for governmental overreaching. With its less exacting procedural and
 com­
pensatory features, the accommodation power should lessen government's un­
derstandable temptation to employ the police power where a compensatory 
approach is compelled by fairness, but is rendered economically unfeasible by 
the requirements of eminent domain. 
Finally, the accommodation power may prove useful in overcoming equal 
protection objections that are often presented as confiscation problems. De­
spite their use of taking language, courts invalidate many measures, not be­
cause they drive the economic return of affected parcels below the Reasonable 
Beneficial Use standard, but because they do not grant to some landowners 
the economic benefits that they afford to others who are similarly situated. 
Richard Babcock's example136 of the upzoning of one quadrant of a highway 
intersection for commercial uses comes to mind, as does the selective zoning 
of land into alternate bands of high and low density development to achieve 
phased development137 or an orderly distribution of kinds of uses. Confiscation 
is not the objection of the disappointed owners of land in the other three 
quadrants or within the areas designated for low density development, re-
PUBLIC CONTROL ( 1972 ) .  It is fruitless to attempt to answer in a cultural vacuum the 
question-Which economic expectancies in "private" land are the state's and which the 
landowner's ? This question could be confidently resolved in a manner favoring private 
rights in the United States through at least the early part of this century because of a 
larger societal consensus that viewed land as an object of private commercial exploita­
tion. While this consensus is now breaking down, it has by no means disappeared entirely. 
Because the expectation of some degree of economic return remains vital in the func­
tioning of the American economic system and in American attitudes towards land gener­
ally, in my judgment it is as improper as it is futile to urge as a replacement for that 
consensus a view that wholly disdains private economic expectations. Hence, my dis­
agre�ment with THE TAKING IssuE's j urisprudence or, if you will, anthropology. It is 
possible that the_ f1;1t_ure may bring a shift in prevailing community standards as they 
bea.r both . on pr_1ont1es for regulatory goals and on the fairness of allowing the losses 
which . their ac�1evement under the police power portends to fall disproportionately on 
some m the pnvate sector. Perhaps the nation will  move to a situation akin to that in 
�ngland where, accor�ing to R. W. G. Bryant, "purely speculative profit-making in land 
is 
· · . regarded as be_mg not quite respectable," id. at 325, and owners of land in green­belt areas who are .virtually barred . from de_veloping at all "must simply accept this as ?ne of. the facts of hfe, whatever their financial loss." Id. at 127. If it does, a correspond­ing �hift of the R�asonable Beneficial Use standard on the Spectrum of Land Use In­tens1� would �e . 1� order. �here is no logical conflict, in short, between holding an ess�ntt�lly relattv1stic concepti_on of property rights, such as that presented by Professor �h1lbn�k, see �ext accompanying note 16 siiprf!-, and insisting that, in a given society at a g.1ven ttm�, this concept10n non.etheless ;equtres recognition of a residuum of private nghts whtc� the . sta�e may not mvade without compensation. 135. This pomt is further developed at text accompanying notes 224-28 infra. 
. 
,f
 36. �
 BABCOCK, THE
. 
ZONING GAME 169-70 ( 1 %6 ) .  In the hypothetical portrayed m
. h 
HE 1 ofIN� GAME, Richard B?bcock suggests that a true confiscation obj ection mig t a so ie ��ause the low �en�tty of the non-upzoned land in the three quadrants �a{
6
9�ount to permanent dedication of . . . open space without compensation." Id. 
137. See Fairfax County v. Allman, 211  S.E.2d 48 ( 1975 ) .  
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spectively, as long as the zoning applicable to these owners meets the Rea­
sonable Beneficial Use test. Rather, it is that government has bestowed eco­
nomic benefits on some landowners whose physical situation may differ 
imperceptibly from that of the unlucky plaintiffs.188 
The possible unfairness to these disappointed landowners can be reme­
died in one of three ways:  by compensating them ;139 by requiring the favored 
landowners to pay for the upzoning ;140 or by combining these alternatives, 
and using the payments of the favored owners to compensate the disfavored.141 
Whichever route is taken, the accommodation power should prove helpful in 
fixing both the medium and the extent of compensation-or recoupment-that 
are appropriate in specific instances. Although it is impossible to do more 
here than broach this suggestion, it could well occur that, in the long run, 
the accommodation power's contribution to the resolution of this problem will 
give a greater boost to rational land management than its aid in solving the 
confiscation dilemma. 
B. The Accommodation Power: Implicit Judicial and Legislative Recognition 
Judicial and legislative recognition of the accommodation power is na­
scent at best. Both institutions are backing into recognition rather than arriv­
ing at it through deliberate reflection and articulate choice. Emergent aware­
ness, moreover, is encrusted with traditional conceptions, many of which deny 
the very tendencies that the power seeks to nurture. Despite or even because 
of these uncertainties and masked conflicts, examples of the tensions attending 
the power's emergence may aid in its further delineation. Selected for con­
sideration from the j udicial side is the well-known New York Court of Appeals 
decision, Golden v. Planning Board (Ramap o ) , 142 which approved the Town 
of Ramapo's controversial growth management plan. Although Ramapo is 
celebrated-or reviled-for its treatment of exclusionary zoning, our concern 
will be with Ramapo 's other dimension-its holding that a regulatory mea­
sure that barred the subdivision of private land for up to 18 years was not 
a "taking." Culled from the legislative side is a resource protection technique 
called transferable development rights ( TDR ) ,  which has attracted widespread 
attention . TDR compensates owners for restrictions on the development of 
138. Id. The Allman court conceded that the plaintiff's parcel could have been devel­
oped "withO'Jt loss" under the existing zoning, but observed that the parcel would in­
crease in value by almost $2.5 million if upzoned to a density equivalent to that which the 
county had permitted for proximate parcels. Id. The court's basic concern, however, was 
that the selective upzoning of these latter parcels was unfair to property owners, such as 
the plaintiff, whose land was retained in its low density classification, in order to achieve 
the county's planning objective of phased development. Id. at 52-55. 
139. See R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 1 70 ( 1966) .  
140. See M. CLAWSON, SUBURBAN LAND CONVERSION IN THE UNITED STATES 184-86 
( 1971 ) .  
141. See generally Hagman, A New Deal: Windfalls for Wipeoitts, 40 PLANNING 9 
(No. 8, 1974) ; cf. text accompanying notes 168-72 infra. 
142. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y. S.2d 138 (1972).  
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their land, not with dollars, but with the entitlement to transfer their unused 
development rights to parcels elsewhere.143 Examined first is the question of 
whether TDR should be predicated on the police or the accommodation power ; 
and, second is a 1974 New York trial court decision, Fred F. French Invest­
ing Company v. City of New York ( Tudor Parks) ,144 which, in striking down 
a TDR program, illustrates the pitfalls that await programs based on the 
accommodation power if they are assessed using ill-fitting police or eminent 
domain power standards. 
1 .  The Courts: Ramapo's  "O ther Di,mension." Ramapo is properly re­
garded as heralding the unprecedented power of local governments to manage 
community growth. But Ramapo's treatment of the taking problem, largely 
ignored in commentary, is no less dramatic. One searches the reports in vain 
for prior judicial sanction of regulatory measures which restrain the devel­
opment of private land for nearly a generation. What are found are opinions 
that grouse over development moratoria of a few years or less, 145 or- that go 
so far as to declare that official map reservations of school or park lands for 
only one year are literal takings. 146 
The Ramapo court was not unaware that it was sanctioning extraordinary 
restraints. Though dissenting from the maj ority view on the plan's exclu­
sionary aspects, Judge Breitel intimated his concurrence that the plan was 
not confiscatory.147 Observing that the taking problem is not "insuperable," he 
set forth the text for which this article is exegesis by commenting that " [ t J here 
is little doubt that the compulsion of current interests and conflicts will re­
quire a re-examination of much legal and judicial thinking in this area."148 
Despite the absence of explicit recognition of the accommodation power, both 
the majority and, derivatively, the dissenting opinions effectively validated 
it in sustaining the 18-year restriction. What saved the plan from being con­
fiscatory was, in their view, its deliberate inclusion of factors that mitigated 
its otherwise draconian impact and thereby satisfied fundamental considerations 
of fairness. Among the factors which elevated the economic return on affected 
lands from what was surely a negative value to what the majority149 found 
to be a Reasonable B eneficial Use return were : a residual right to construct 
a single family residence on plattable land ; an interim reduction in real estate 
taxes keyed to the depreciation caused by the restrictions ; an option afforded 
to the landowner to accelerate the construction date by providing the requisite 
143. See authorities cited in note 168 infra. 
144. 77 Misc. 2d 199, 352 N.Y.S.Zd 762 ( Sup. Ct. 1 973) aff'd mem 47 App Div 2d 7 1 5, 366 N.Y. S.Zd 346, motion for lem:e to appeal granted, 47 App. Di·�. 2d 815
. 
( 1975) . 145. Sc�, e.g., Meadowlands Regional Dev. Agency v. Hackensack Meadowlands Dev. Comm n, 1 1 9  N.J. Super 572, 293 A.2d 192, petition for cert. denied, 62 N.J. 72, 299 A.2d 69 ( 1 972) ; Mang v. County of Santa Barbara 182 Cal App 2d 93 5 Cal Rptr. 724 ( 1960 ) ; Annot., 30 A.L.R.3d 1 196 ( 1 970) .  ' · · ' · 
146. Lomarch Corp. v. City of Englewood, S I  N.J. 108, 237 A 2d 881 ( 1968) 147. 30 N.Y.Zd 359, 387-90, 285 N.E.Zd 291 ,  307-09, 334 N.Y.S.2d 1 38 I60-6Z ( 1972 ) .  148. Id. a t  390, 285 N.E.2d at 309, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 162 ' 149. Id. at 381 -83, 285 N.E.2d at 304-05, 334 N.Y.S.2d �t 1 54-56. 
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public facilities ; the right to proceed with development in accordance with 
the town's capital improvements timetable, whether or not the town met that 
timetable ;  the present vesting and assignability of the future right to develop·; 
the benefit of substantial incremental values that would accrue in time to the 
restricted land as a consequence of the phased installation of public facilities 
pursuant to a carefully elaborated comprehensive plan ; and the "temporary" 
nature of the restrictions, which were imposed, not to enhance the town's 
resource position, but to coordinate private advantage with public facilities 
and needs. 
It is not my purpose to argue that the court was correct in its conclusion 
that these features i n  fact afforded the plaintiffs a Reasonable Beneficial Use 
return. Indeed, one of the curiosities of the plaintiffs' presentation was their 
apparent failure to marshal precise economic data on this crucial issue.150 Nor 
do I believe that these features exemplify the accommodation power in as 
pristine a form as does, for example, the TDR program employed to protect 
the Tudor Parks.151 Certainly, neither the Ramapo public officials nor the 
Court of Appeals e xplicitly conceived of the plan as a showcase for that 
power, since the accommodation power nomenclature is original to this article. 
But my analysis is intended to demonstrate that the court's preoccupation 
with these features evidences its appreciation that the 18-year restriction could 
not be justified solely on conventional police power grounds. That power's 
hallmark, after all, is noncompensatory regulation to protect community 
health, safety and welfare, and not the compensation of land owners burdened 
by needful public regulation. Professor Freund emphasized this point in his 
now-classic distinction between the police and eminent domain powers : 
[ I ] t  may be said that the state takes property by eminent domain 
because it is useful to the public, and under the police power because 
it is harmful. . . .  From this results the difference between the power 
of eminent domain and the police power, that the former recognizes 
a right to compensation, while the latter on principle does not.1112 
150. Id. at 380-81, 285 N.E.2d at 303, 334 N .Y.S .2d at 154. 
151. See text accompanying notes 195-210 infra. 
152. E. FREUND, THE POLICE POWER 546-47 ( 1 904) . 
This position recurs in land use precedents both old and new. For example, one of 
the objections raised by the landowner in Hadacheck v. City of Los Angeles, 239 U.S. 
394 (1915 ) ,  against a zoning ordinance barring the use of his land for brickmaking pur­
poses was that, in prohibiting his business altogether, the ordinance was unduly harsh. 
Rejecting this contention, the court declared that " . . .  we ca1U1ot declare invalid the 
exertion of a power [the police power] which the city undoubtedly has because of a 
charge that it does not exactly accommodate the conditions [that it sought to achieve] 
or that some other exercise would have been better or less harsh." Id. at 413-14. More 
recently, in Scrutton v. County of Sacramento, 275 Cal. App. 2d 412, 79 Cal. Rptr. 872 
(1969) , a California court invalidated an exaction imposed by a public authority pursuant 
to its approval of a rezoning application, despite the latter's insistence that the exaction 
would redound to the developer's economic benefit. " [F] ulfillment of public needs emanat­
ing from the proposed land use is the sine qua nori of the exaction's reasonableness," the 
court insisted. Id. at 422, 79 Cal. Rptr. at 880. Further, it reasoned : 
Standing alone, the landowner's economic benefit supplies inadequate under­
pinning for the exaction. The police power forms the exaction's constitutional 
foundation. That power is aimed at public need, not private profit. The landowner 
shcnld be free to reject the paternalism which forces him into an exaction con­
ceived for his personal benefit. 
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A straightforward way of testing the proposition is to ask what the 
Ramapo result would have been had the town simply barred subdivision for 
18 years, wholly ignoring the restriction's private economic impacts. Prior case 
law and the obviously drastic nature of that restriction leave little doubt that 
the court would have struck down the plan as confiscatory. But through its 
elaborately crafted network of economic trade-offs-none of which, incidently, 
entails direct dollar compensation-the Ramapo plan was saved from this 
outcome and, more to the point, demonstrated that there is indeed a middle 
ground between the police and eminent domain powers. 
But isn't the argument plausible that the plan's economic trade-offs 
simply brought the 18-year restriction under the police power's "reasonable-
; ness" umbrella ? Yes, if it is conceded that the police power has developed since 
the time when Professor Freund wrote into two separate branches, each with 
its distinctive "reasonableness" test. Whichever labels are chosen, however, the 
essential point, r eflected in Rarnapo, is that there is a class of regulatory 
measures that fits neither into the traditional p olice nor eminent domain power 
niches and that escapes the confiscation objection only by affording burdened 
landowners fair compensation in the form of appropriate economic trade-offs. 
I prefer the accommodation power label because it promises to nurture a 
"fairness discipline"153 that is all too often ignored when measures are in­
discriminately lumped under the police power heading. The label signals more 
clearly the necessity for a form of accounting that, while less demanding than 
that of formal eminent domain, is assuredly more searching than its traditional 
police power equivalent. The latter's impressionistic and typically conclusion­
ary speculation, tied to some vague "balancing" of public and private interests, 
invites grave injustice when restrictions of the magnitude of those in Ramapo 
and Just154 are i n  issue. 
The label also promises greater rationality in judicial opinions evaluating 
borderline restrictions. I llustrative of the confusion that currently reigns in 
the reports are the federal district155 and circuit court156 opinions in A rt Neon 
Company v. City and County of Denver. In treating the plaint of billboard 
interests that a six-year amortization provision of Denver's sign ordinance was 
confiscatory, both courts became ensnared in the conceptual inadequacies of 
police and eminent domain doctrine, as traditionally conceived.157 The lower 
court (Art Neon I )  defined as the issue whether or not the amortization pro-
Id. at 422, 79 Cal. Rp�r. at 880. Taken together, Hadacheck and Scrntton emphasize that 
!he abse.nce of economic benefit t? the landowner does not impugn a police power measure, JUSt as its presence does not validate as a police power measure a restriction purportedly founded on that power. 
153. The phrase is that of Professor Michelman. See Michelman supra note 17 at 1246. ' ' 
1 54. See notes 1 1 7, 126, 142-52 and accompanying text supra. 155. 357 F. Supp. 466 (D. Colo. 1973 ) .  
156. 488 F.2d 1 1 8  ( 10th Cir. 1974) . 
157. Although only Art Neon I and II 3:r� d�scussed _in text, the d isagreement of these two courts recurs in the volwninous htigatJon dealing with nonconforming use 
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vision afforded just compensation for a formal taking.1118 Adverting to a United 
States Supreme Court159 holding that, in leasehold condemnation cases gener­
ally, just compensation must include a premium for the likelihood of leasehold 
renewal (a routine practice among billboard lessors and lessees) ,  the court 
ruled that the amortization period alone failed to measure up, and it admon­
ished that "legislative rough approximations of just compensation won't do."160 
But in the eyes of the circuit court (Art Neon II) ,  eminent domain law 
had nothing to do with the piece. To the appellate court, the case turned in­
stead on the amortization provision's "reasonableness" under the police 
power.161 Rebuking the trial court, it proclaimed that the reasonableness test 
"is not a test of concept of 'just compensation,' " and that the amortization 
technique "contains no connotation of compensation or a requirement there­
for."162 But its analysis belied these categorical assertions on two counts. First, 
the considerations it enumerated in profiling the reasonableness test contra­
dicted the court 's alleged disinterest in the provision's compensatory dimen­
sion. These included : 
the nature of the nonconforming use, the character of the structure, 
the location, what part of the individual's total business is concerned, 
the time periods, salvage, depreciation for income tax purposes, and 
depreciation for other purposes, and the monopoly or advantage, if 
any, resulting from the fact that similar new structures are prohibited 
in the same area.168 
If the provision were a police power exercise, pure and simple, most of these 
considerations would be gratuitous ; like the factors identified in Ramapo, 
they speak to the mitigation of private loss, not to the prevention of land 
uses that, in Professor Freund's formulation, are "harmful" to the public. 
amortization measures. As with these two cases, the opinions conflict sharply in their 
assessment of whether these measures are police power- or eminent domain power-based. 
Compare Hoffmann v. Kinealy, 389 S.W.2d 745 ( Mo.  1965) (eminent domain) ,  with 
City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 ( 1954) ( police power) .  
See generally Annot., 22 A.L.R.3d 1 134 ( 1968 ) .  
Other opinions can be found, however, which implicitly recognize that neither power 
affords an appropriate predicate for these measures. See, e.g., Naegele Outdoor Adv. Co. 
v. Village of Minnetonka, 281 Minn. 492, 162 N.W.2d 206 ( 1%8) ; Grant v. Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 ( 1 957) . As noted in text, see text 
accompanying note 68 supra, Grant concedes its w illingness to place amortization on a 
police power footing only because of the awkwardness of eminent domain doctrine. And 
though Naegele too terms amortization a police power exercise, its analysis falls just short 
of treating it as an eminent domain concept. Hence, it reasons : 
If the value of the plaintiff's property interest was extinguished before the 
running of the three-year [amortization] period, there would be no taking, or if 
the value of freedom from new competition for the stat"Jtory period equalled 
the value of the property interest remaining at the end of the period, there would 
be just compensation [sic] for the taking. 
Id. at SOI, 162 N.W.2d at 213. 
158. Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 357 F. Supp. 466, 471, 473 (D. 
Colo. 1973) . 
159. Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States; 409 U.S. 470 
( 1 973) .  
160. Art Neon Co. v .  City and County o f  Denver, 3 5 7  F. Supp. 466, 478 (D. Colo. 
1973) . 
161. Art Neon Co. v. City and County of Denver, 488 F.2d 118, 121 ( 10th Cir. 1974) . 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 122. 
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Second the court expressly relied upon Berman v. Pa
rker as authority for 
its bro�d reading of the police power's scope, and quoted
 i n  full Justice 
Douglas' famous dictum extolling aesthetics as a planning go
al .  ' 6.4 As no
ted 
earlier,165 however, Berman dealt not with the police power but wi
th the pro­
priety of governmental use of eminent domain for urban renewal purposes . 
Since the question in Art Neon was not whether government may pursue 
aesthetic goals-the litigants and both courts conceded t hat it could-but 
whether government must compensate when it seeks to achieve those goals 
by eliminating u�sightly bil lboards , B erman is obv iously i napposite. Its role 
as the centerpiece of the circuit cou rt's  opinion does point up, perhaps unwit­
tingly, that court's ambivalence on t h e  compensation problem. 
In short, the circuit court was correct in its premise that the reasonable­
ness test "is not a test of 'just compensat ion . ' " but wrong in concluding there­
fore that the amort ization technique contains " ' no connotation of compensation 
or a requirement therefor ."166 This non sequ itur resulted because the court 
failed to recognize that fair compensation was an intermediate approach be­
tween just compen sat ion and no compensation, despite its use of reasoning 
that in fact pointed in this direction. One wou ld l tave l iked to have seen a third 
opinion, an Art N con I ,Yi as it were, in which the conceptual inadequacies 
of tired police power/eminent domain doctrine were frankly ack nowledged 
and the corresponding need for a third alternative acldressed . 1 67 
164. Id. at 1 2 1 .  
165. See text accompanying notes 59-67 rnpra. 
166. 488 F.2d at 1 2 1 .  
16?. A n  �xample of implicit j udicial use of t h e  Spectrum o f  Land U se I ntensity ap­
pears m. Just1ce Hall's opinion in Morris County Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany­
T;oy_ Hills, 40 N.J. 539, _ 1 93 A.2d 232 ( 1 963 ) ( Morris County I ) .  Rej ected as uncon­stt,;.ittonally confiscatory m that case. was the zoning of the developer-plainti ff's land as a Meadows Development Zone." This classification precluded him from any but agricul­
tural or aquaculture-related uses. Embroidering somewhat on the facts i n Morris Coimf\' 
I, the parc�l's economic value might be portrayed as fol lows on the Spectrum of Land 
Use Intensity : 
� 
SPECTRUM OF LA N D  USE I NT E N S I T Y  
� 
� INTENSITY I NDEX 
E-< 
0 Cl.. 
E-< 
z 
� 
� 
Cl.. 
Highest and Best Use 
Unrestricted by Public 
Regulation 
0 Allowable Use 
� 
Gi 
Q Reasonable Beneficial Use 
C-' 
z ..... 
�
 Resource Protection Use 
5 
z .... Zero Intensity Use 
U S E  
Industrial 
Gravel Extraction 
Single Family House 
l Dwell ing Unit/ Acre 
Meadows Development Zone 
(Aquacult;ire Use) 
None 
VALUE 
$4.000.000 
$2.000.000 
$ 500.000 
$ -40,000 
$ -20,000 
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2. The Legislatures: Transferable Development Rights (TDR) as a 
Harbinger of the Accommodation Power. 
a. A n  Overview of TDR Programs.168 TDR programs modify conven­
tional property conceptions in two respects .  First, they divide "property" into 
If the court had deemed the zoning a literal taking, it would have had no choice 
but to direct the township to pay for the less-than-fee interest "condemned" or, at the 
least, to leave the land unzoned, freeing the developer to do as he wished with it. In 
fact, Justice Hall approved neither alternative. Disdaining any discussion of payment, 
he warned that voiding all zoning "would permit the establishment of any use by any 
means-a result which might well be damaging to the overall local public interest." 
Id. at 559, 193 A.2d 243-44. Instead, he directed the township to increase the parcel's 
development potential sufficiently to cure the constitutional objection, but authorized it 
to give full weight, consistent with constit'.itional constraints, to the "special character­
istics and particular problems of the district." Id. at 559, 193 A.2d at 244. The decree 
splits the difference between the extremes of the police and eminent domain power 
resolutions. Cf. ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE § 9-1 12(3) ( Proposed Official 
Draft 1975) [hereinafter cited as CODE] . 
Morris County I shows that there is an alternative to leaving the land "completely 
unzoned" when a regulation is declared invalid. See Enclos1tre, supra note 30, at 1253. For 
results analogous to Morris County I,  see, e.g., Sinclair Pipe Line Co. v. Village of 
Richton Park, 1 9  Ill.  2d 370, 167 N.E.2d 406 ( 1 960) ; City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, 217 
So. 2d 836 ( Fla. 1969 ) .  See generally 2 C. R.ATH KOPF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLAN­
NING, ch. 36, § 6 (3d ed. 1972) . The view that invalidation leaves the land unzoned may 
be shaped in part by the loose assertion in some precedents that if the courts went fur­
ther, they would violate the separation of powers doctrine. See, e.g., Fairfax County v. 
Allman, 215 Va. 434, 2 1 1  S.E.2d 48 (1975 ) ; City of Miami Beach v. Weiss, supra. This 
is a misconception. Justice Hall's resohtion only brackets the area on the Spectrum of 
Land Use Intensity within which the township may permissibly zone ; it does not mandate 
a specific outcome for local legislative officials. Moreover, some interpenetration of judicial 
and legislative roles in this area is inevitable. A better explanation for the judicial defer­
ence is the greater familiarity of legislators with local circumstances, planning goals, 
and resources allocable to compensatory regulation. 
A direct judicial application of the accommodation power would occur where, in 
an "eminent domain" proceeding, the condemnee successfully attacks the zoning of his 
parcel as confiscatory, and the court provides for its valuation on a Reasonable' Beneficial 
Use level rather than on its status as "unzoned,"--i.e., its Highest and Best Use Unre­
stricted by Public Regulation. Cf. CODE § 5-303 ( 5 ) .  Al though this result would seem to be 
called for by Justice Hall's reasoning, a New Jersey intermediate court granted relief 
based on the Highest and Best Use standard in a companion case to Morris County I, 
Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. Morris County Land Improvement Co., 91 N.J.  
Super. 40, 219 A.Zd 180 (App. Div. 1966) (Morris County II) . While Morris County I 
was pending before the New Jersey Supreme Court, the power company initiated eminent 
domain proceedings to acquire a public utility easement over nine acres of the developer's 
land. Prior to the completion of those proceedings, Justice Hall rendered his decision. 
Had the Morris County II court honored Hall's reasoning, the nine acres would have 
been valued on a Reasonable Beneficial Use level, which pres·Jmably would have been 
skewed between its Resource Protection level ( Meadowlands Development Zone) and its 
Allowable Use level ( Gravel Extraction) .  Instead, the court opted for the Highest and 
Best Use Unrestricted by Public Regulation level ( Industrial) ,  incorrectly assuming 
that Morris County I 
must be held as having declared the "Meadows Development Zone" regulations 
void in their very inception. Accordingly, there was no valid zoning regulation 
with regard to the property in question at the time of the taking, and defendant 
was entitled to an instruction [refused by the trial court] to that effect. 
Id. at 49, 219 A.2d at 184. The Morris C otinty II result, apparently replicated elsewhere, 
see Zogby v. State, 53 Misc. 2d 740, 279 N.Y.S.2d 665 ( Ct. Cl., N.Y. 1967 ) ,  is unfortu­
nate both in its failure . to heed Justice Hall's actual reasoning and in its resulting imposi­
tion of an indefensible surcharge on the public fisc-results that could be avoided in 
future litigation of this type by explicit use of the accommodation power. 
168. For more detailed treatment of the TDR concept, see, e.g., THE TRANSFER OF 
DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS : A NEW TECH NIQUE OF LAND UsE REGULATION (Rose ed. 1975) ; 
Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An E.xploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973) ; 
Transferable Development Rights (ASPO PAS Report No. 304, Mar. 1975 ) ; Transfer 
of Development Rights, 34 URBAN LAND 1 ( 1975 ) .  
Specific TDR proposals and accompanying case studies include J.  CosTONIS & J. 
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two root components : the physical lan
d itself and the develop111e1�t potent�al 
or "development rights" of that land, 
u sually measured by the zomng
 restric­
tions applicable to it. Second, they aut
horize the transfer of these developme
nt 
rights from the host parcel to other pa
rcels whose total development rights 
are thereby proportionately augmented. A
lthough the rationale for permitting 
transfers encompasses a variety of urban d
esign, planning and land transactions 
goals, TDR's major attraction is its role i
n offsetting economic hardships in­
curred by private landowners as a result 
of resource protection programs. 
Examples of such hardships might include the 
plight of the owner who must 
preserve a diminutive landmark building in a ce
ntral business district zoned 
for New Brutalist megastructures, or the owner w
ho must retain as open 
space prime land lying in the path of, and zoned for, co
mmercial or residential 
development. Fundamental to TDR is the premise that t
he resource owner's 
confiscation obj ection to such regulation will be blunted by
 the benefits that 
he is enabled to receive, either by selling his package of deve
lopment rights 
to owners of transferee parcels, or, should he also be the owner of 
the trans­
feree site, by retaining the market value of the additional development pote
ntial 
that the rights represent. 
The typical TDR program proceeds in four phases.  First,  the administer-
ing authority must pinpoint the sites from which development rights may be 
transferred. The criterion for selection may be either protection of improve­
ments on the ·sites, as in the case of landmark buildings, or protection of the 
sites themselves, as i n  the case of ecologically sensitive prime agricultural or 
open-space lands. In both cases, the authority fears that the present low density 
of the sites renders them vulnerable to market pressures for more intensive 
development-from landmark to office tower or from nature preserve to con­
dohotel. 
Second, the authority must identify correlative "transfer districts " areas 
to ":h�ch the rights may be transferred. These districts must be app�opriate 
rece1�mg areas for added density both in l ight of the community's over-all 
planning goals and of the capacity of the districts' physical and service infra­
structures to absorb the density. Next, machinery for the actual transfer of 
SHLAES, DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFERS · A SoLUTI 
DILEMMA (Chicago Chapter Foundation of th A . 
0I T? CHrCAGo's LANDMARKS 
tional Trust for Historic Preservation 1971 )  
� 
J 
mCncan nstitute of Architects & Na­
PRESERVATION AND THE MARKETPLACE ( 1974) '( : h �
T
i
N
IS, 
SPACE ADRIFT : LANDMARK 
PuE.R1:o. Rrco �LAN, supra. In the .first of these ��ies 0 M
rt De V oy and Rai Okamoto) ; 
feas1b1hty �ectlon and contributed major insights t 't , 
r. Shlaes prepared the economic 
De Voy, aide� by his associates at Real Estate R�s 
I s conceptual �nd legal portions. Mr. 
draft and reviewed the final draft of the economic 
e�rc� Cor
(
13orat1on, prepared the basic 
supra, as well as providing valuable assistance o� :: r.r and 4)  of SPACE ADRIFT 
��am?to played a sin:iilar role regarding the urban desi 
�R study as a whole ; Mr'. 
� ew1se! the ec�nom1cs section of the PUERTO Rico PLgn c. apter ( 5 )  of SPACE ADRIFT. 
w o agam con!ributed broadly to that study's oth 
A� is the work of Mr. De Voy 
Other pertment TDR studies are referenc d 
. er sections. ' 
fol�ows: A more complete TDR bibliogra h :nd 
m t�e. footnotes to the subsection that 
legislation can be found in Transferable Dr:n,�lopm at 
I
R
�
mh
g of pending or adopted TDR en ig ts, supra at 63-64. 
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rights must be set in motion. Under some schemes, transfers occur exclusively 
between private landowners subject to general public supervision. Under 
others, only government can transfer the rights, and the resulting income is 
used to create an "Environmental Trust Fund"169 from which cash awards 
are made to resource owners. A mixed pattern of private and governmental 
transfers is prescribed by a third variant ; here, government makes the transfer 
only if the resource owner declines to d o  so. Again, the income generated 
through public sale is  used to cancel the costs to government of compensating 
affected owners. I n  return for compensation, the resource owner must provide 
firm assurances that his site will be developed consistently with the Resource 
Protection restrictions ; typically, a less-than-fee protective interest is con­
veyed to government for this purpose. 
Lastly, criteria must be devised to d etermine exactly what the owner 
ought to receive for his losses under the program, whether payment is made 
in development rights or in dollars. Two patterns prevail .  One determines 
the compensation b y  measuring the difference between the quantity of rights 
actually used at the resource site and the total quantity of rights authorized 
for the site by existing zoning.17° For example, if a landmark site i s  currently 
zoned to permit the construction of an office building containing 1 ,000,000 
square feet and the landmark itself contains only 250,000 square feet, the 
site's owner may transfer the remaining 750,000 square feet or, under TDR 
programs incorporating the cash alternative, receive a dollar award equal to 
the value of that increment of space. The second pattern, on the other hand, 
entitles the resource owner to transfer only that quantity of rights--or to 
receive its cash equivalent-required to take up the slack between the economic 
return possible at his site under the Resource Protection zoning and the return 
under zoning fixed at the Reasonable Beneficial Use level.171 If a marginal 
increase in development potential would not endanger the protected resource, 
government may alternatively increase the site's development potential to the 
latter level, much as it does when it grants a variance under traditional zoning 
procedures.172 
Should TDR be predicated on the eminent domain power, on the police 
power or on the accommodation power ? Before that question can b e  answered, 
it is necessary to identify the particular TDR variant addressed. Aside from 
possible procedural complications, the question can confidently be answered 
for those TDR variants that compensate the resource owner in dollars for 
169. The Environmental Trust Fund is an element of the proposal advanced in the 
PUERTO Rrco PLAN, supra note 13, at 9-24. 
170. This approach is taken, inter alia, under the New York City TDR program 
for landmark preservation. See New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution art. VII, ch. 4, §§ 74-
79, 74-791 to -793 ( 1975 ) .  See generally Gilbert, Saving Landmarks: The Transfer of 
Development Rights, 22 HIST. PRESERVATION 1 3  ( 1970) . 
171. For an example of this approach, see PUERTO Rico PLAN, supra note l3, at 9-24. 
172. Id. 
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h d.ff · h"  "t ' alue before and after the progra m  i
s  i nstituted. 
t e 1 erence m 1s s1 e s v 
By hypothesis, these variants square with eminent domai n  duct
r
_
ine'. ( ; iven 
a jurisdiction, moreover, in which the special benefits c\oct n ne 1 s .  l ther
ally 
interpreted, TDR variants compensating the owner in clevelopmetH nght s �al­
culated by the above measure will also comport with eminent d0111a111 doctrine. 
If these rights are equal to the combined value of the parcel acquirecl ( the 
less-than-fee protective interest in the s it e ) and to the damages . i f  any, accru­
ing to the remainder (the resource site itself and, if  relevant , i t s  improve­
ments ) ,  then they will cancel out any compensat ion c lue the owner in a 
jurisdiction which permits special benefit s  to be set off aga inst amrnm t s  due 
under both headings.173 
In its differences from these patterns, the varian t adc l ressccl below may 
properly be termed TD R's hardest case. l' n c ler i t , accept atKe of non - clollar 
compensation in the form of development r ig-lit s is 111a11 c lat ory. not optional, 
with the resource owner.174 Further, the quantum of t ra n sicrable right s is 
173. See text accompanying notes 79-89 .rnprn. 
The position offered in text reflects a substant ial l'V< > lut io1 1  . , f m y  \' l <'W 011 tlw con­
stitutional status of development rights as adequat<· rompensati l l t t  1 11 a11 ear l irr art irle, 
I posed, but did not resolve, the question whether T D R  would lw co11st i tutionally 11<-fec­
tive because development rights arc not cash compl'nsation a11d. i 1 1  t l w  ,·as•· of j m i,di("tions 
permitting special benefits to be set-off aga i11s t the pared tak .. 1 1 .  hn·aus•· dt·Hl1 1pt11t•nt 
rights might be deemed to have too specu lat ive a value to qual ify a s  spt·c ial lw11cft ts .  Sec 
Costonis, The Chica5;0 Pla11 : l11cn1li<•r Zm1i11y a11d th1· / 'r1·St"n·11 1 i  .. 11 "! l " r l•an l.m1d­
marks, 85 HARV. L. REv. 574, 598 n.75 ( 1 972 ) .  As incl i,·atcd in  t<- x t ,  l 1 1 1w rn·r. I a111 now 
confident, first, that the dollar compensation obj ect ion i s  not c1 1n1p1· l l i 1 1g if T i l l{  is 
predicated on the accommodation power, ancl. second, that in j u r i sd i,· t io11s p•· r111 i t t i111( the 
set-off of special benefits aga inst the parcel taken, <kvelop111t·11t r ii.:hts  0111-:hl rk:irly to 
qualify as special benefits even from the perspect ivl' of ,·111i11t·nt do111ai 11  doctr i1w. The 
latter judgment i s  the direct outgrowth of the three cast· s tml it·s mtdl'rtaken by thl' writer 
with Messrs. Shlaes and De Voy, see note 168 rnprn. which arl' pnsuasi vc that the 
value of development rights is no more speculat ive and, in fact. a i.:ood dl'a l less sn. than 
other . economic opportunities that have traditionally compor ted w i t h  the special ht·nefits 
doctrme. 
1_7�. Fur-Lex Realty, Inc. v. Lindsay, 376 N . Y . S.2cl 388 ( Sup.  Ct. 1975 1 ronfirms 
that It 1s the mandatory character of T D R  as forced compensation rather than the TOR 
concept itself that will prove a sticking point for the courts . .-\ t issul' in  that case was 
t�e validity of a transaction in which the City of !'\ew York entered i 1 1to a lease of the 
site of the Appel late Division ( First D istrict) Courthouse, a designated lanclmark. which 
enabled the lessee, th� owner of an adj oining site. to transfer 100.00  sq uar e feet of the 
unused development nghts of the Courthouse site to his site. The Courthouse s i te was then sub.leased back to t�e city for cont_inued; use as a courthouse. less thl' deve lopment rights. This arrangement !S further descnbed m Coston is ,  Thr ("ltifOqo P/1111 : foa·nti;·,· Zo11i11g an<! _the Preservat�on of Urbait Landmarks, 85 HARV. L. RF.v. 574, 586 n.44 ( 1972 ) .  Jommg bo�h the city and the private lessee as defendants. Fur - Lex Realtv.  a lessee of a nearby City parcel, Challenged the transaction On the grounds inter a/ia of spot zoning and of improper ?ispo�ition of municipal property. The court ' rej ec ted hoth ·content ions on the defen?ants motion for summary j udgment. Fur-Lex tre�tment of the spot zoning objection is to be contrasted with that in T�dor P_arks, which s1:1ggested, as an alternative basis for its ruling. that the latter TDR s\��e mva
f
ded the nghts of property owners at sites adjoinin!(' the site or sites to w . 1c trans ers could be made, see Fred F. French Inv. Co v Cit . of :\'ew 'York 77 Misc. 2� 199, 352 N.Y.S.2d 762 ( Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co 1 973 ) .T h· . ) · · . ' dorsed m an article criti I f th · N · . · is position has been . en-D ca o e vanous ew York City T D R  5 . .  � t evelopment Rights Transfer iii New y ork Cit 82 y A L programs. " · ? e, that coordinating a specific TDR pro "t�' h LE .J . 383 ( 1 972 ) .  For the view ning regime should obviate this ob"ec�i�: wi t e regulatory authority:s overal l plan­An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L./ 75, 87-9r� 1��st(�i3tcvelopmrnt R19h ts Transfer: 
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equal in value to the difference between his site's Resource Protection and 
Reasonable Beneficial Use values rather than between its Resource Protection 
and Allowable Use (or higher ) values. Since this variant clearly conflicts 
with eminent domain's standard of just compensation, the question is whether 
it rests instead on the police or the accommodation power. Under the ana­
lytical framework developed in this article, the answer is the accommodation 
power. 
t. The Police Power: A Dubious Predicate for TDR. My view is not 
universally shared. Norman Marcus, for example, has placed TDR squarely 
on a police power footing.1711 In his argument, he advances a cogent, indeed 
brilliant, analysis of TDR's two basic postulates : first, that strong legal, 
planning and policy considerations favor the concept of severing development 
rights from their host parcel and transferring them to other land ;176 and sec­
ond, that "because the essence of property [in 20th century America] is its 
potential for profitable use"177 and not its "location in space and dominion 
over a defined surface of land"178 as in earlier times, authorizing resource 
owners to transfer their frozen development rights can be a fair and practicable 
way of mitigating their losses. 
But to conclude from these premises that TDR is therefore founded on 
the police power is unpersuasive. The conclusion resurrects the misconception 
fathered by the Holmes aphorism and compounded, perhaps inadvertently, in 
Berman v. Parker that "regulation" is the exclusive province of the police 
power. In reality, regulation is a goal of all three powers-police, accommo­
dation and eminent domain.179 The conclusion, moreover, does violence to the 
settled view, formulated by Professor Freund and consistently affirmed in 
precedent, that the police power's object is to safeguard community health, 
safety and welfare independently of any concern for compensating burdened 
landowners.180 TDR's raison d'etre, on the other hand, is precisely to insure 
that landowners are fairly treated. Finally, the conclusion's reliance on the 
vague "reasonableness" test of current police power doctrine threatens to 
erode the fairness discipline nurtured by TDR because it implies that TDR's 
compensatory supplements are a matter of legislative grace and not a consti­
tutional imperative.181 
Perhaps my disagreement with Marcus is l ittle more than a qiterelle des 
mots between friends coming at the compensation question from opposite 
directions. Obviously more sympathetic to The Taking Issue's philosophy 
175. See Marcus Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Taking Clause : 
The Case of Manhatt:in's Tudor City Parks, 24 BuFF. L: REv. 77, 77-78, 104-05 ( 1974) . 
176. Id. at 89-94. 
177. Id. at 88. 
178. Id. at 87. 
179. See text accompanying notes 52-67 supra. 
180. See text accompanying notes 150-52 supra. 
181. See text accompanying notes 153-67 supra. 
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than I, Marcus questions why, since the Fifth Amendment is given short shrift 
under recent environmentally-oriented decisions, conscientious governmental 
efforts to extend some compensation to resource owners should not prevail 
when challenged on confiscation grounds.182 Skeptical of that philosophy's 
fairness and its accuracy as a portrayal even of recent taking jurisprudence,183 
I am a good deal more reluctant to fold TDR into the spongy batter of police 
power reasoning. I n  our results, however, we are not far apart. Marcus alludes 
to two kinds of compensation-the more stringent j ust compensation of em­
inent domain law and the less exacting "equitable" or "fair" compensation 
of TDR. Our difference is that he urges employment of the latter "where 
legitimate police power restrictions on private property are at issue."184 As I 
have acknowledged earlier,185 linking fair compensation to the police power 
is not an inherently implausible course, but the basic transformation of the 
police power which such a linkage works must be understood clearly by plan­
ning authorities and the courts. Because I am apprehensive that it will not 
be understood, the linkage approach is less satisfactory in my j udgment than 
recognition of an independent accommodation power. 
ii. The Accommodation Power: A More Fitting Predicate for TDR. 
The Tudor Parks decision, discussed below, confirms that TDR will be chal­
lenged because it does not measure up to formal eminent domain standards. 
The challenge should not succeed. A TDR program's validity should depend 
instead upon whether its promise of compensation is real or illusory. If those 
rights, together with the economic return possible under the parcel's Resource 
Protection zoning, satisfy the Reasonable Beneficial Use standard, the matter 
should end there. But if the development rights certificates are mere bogus 
bills cranked out on some government printing press, firm j udicial intervention 
is in order. 
Fear that development rights will afford illusory compensation recurs in 
commentary186 contesting TDR's constitutionality and tipped the balance 
against the TDR program in Tudor Parks. Concern on this score is certainly 
not unreasonable but it should be tempered with an appreciation of the formal 
requirements of constitutional argument and of the capabilities of standard 
appraisal practice. As to the first, it is important to distinguish facial consti­
tutional challenges from challenges to a measure as applied. The marketability 
of development rights would be in issue in a facial challenge only if the premise 
of marketability were so far-fetched as to be absurd. B ut appraisal sources 
182. See Marcus, supra note 1 75, at 104. 
183. See notes 1 28, 134 supra. 
184. Marcus, supra note 1 75, at 104 (emphasis added) . 
185. See text accompanying note 1 53 supra. 
186. See Note, The Unconstitutional1ty of Transferable Development Rights 84 YALE L.J. 1 10 1  ( 1 975 ) ; Note, Development Rights Transfers in New York City s�""a note 1 74. • r• 
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and judicial precedent established just the opposite. Appraisal theory187 and at 
least three TDR case studies188 fully support the unsurprising proposition 
that increasing a parcel's development potential by transferring development 
rights to it will increase its fair market value, so long as there is a market 
demand for new construction incorporating the transferred rights. Whether 
that market will exist, of course, is a fact question, turning wholly upon the 
contingencies affecting the litigant's parcel and the relevant TDR program and 
land use regime. 
Judicial support appears indirectly i n  numerous decisions equating prop­
erty rights with the right to exploit land for profit189 and directly in the major­
ity190 and concurring191 opinions in the New York Court of Appeals' decision, 
Newport Associates, Inc. v. Solow. Disputed in that case was whether the 
holder of a long-term lease could transfer the leased parcel's unused develop­
ment rights to an adj oining parcel. The question was resolved favorably to 
the defendant-lessee on the ground that the lease did not by its terms preclude 
the transfer. More important for our purposes is language in both opinions 
explicitly describing the contested development rights as a "valuable asset."192 
Judge Breitel's concurring comments in this regard merit quotation in full : 
Plaintiff has lost by defendant's action . . .  a valuable asset in the 
air development rights over its building. It has thereby lost its right 
to "transfer" or use its air development rights by alienation of the 
reversion to an abutting owner, or by acquiring an abutting property. 
That right to transfer or exploit the air development rights required 
no warrant in the zoning ordinance. Air rights, including the special 
floor area ratios defined in the ordinance, are valuable and transfer­
able, even if only as an (ldjunct to a reversion or to a long-term lease­
hold.193 
The appropriate mode, therefore, for challenging a TDR program is as it 
applies to specific landowners. Centering on the marketworthiness of the 
rights, such challenges will require careful preparation by the resource owner 
and the planning authority, and will call for substantially more than the im­
pressionistic j udicial scrutiny typifying current zoning litigation. On the other 
hand, they will be markedly less taxing for the courts and litigants than are 
formal eminent domain proceedings. Standard appraisal methodologies and 
187. See, e.g., Shlaes, The Economics of Development Rights Transfers, 42 APPRAISAL 
J. 526 (1974) ; Graaskamp, Impressions on the Marketability of TDRs (ASPO PAS 
Report No. 304, Mar. 1 975 ) .  
188. See note 1 68, supra. 
189. See, e.g., Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 1 9  N.Y.2d 78, 224 N.E.2d 700, 278 
N.Y.S.2d 185 ( 1 966) ; Piper v. Ekern, 180 Wis. 586, 194 N.W. 159 ( 1923 ) .  
190. 30 N.Y.2d 263, 283 N.E.2d 600, 332 N.Y.S.2d 617 ( 1972 ) ,  cert. denied, 410 
U.S. 931. 
191. Id. at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 602, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621. 
192. Id. at 267, 268, 283 N.E.2d at 602, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 620, 621. 
193. Id. at 268, 283 N.E.2d at 602-03, 332 N.Y.S.2d at 621. 
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market analysis techniques can establish the value of development rights with 
a degree of precision that will enable the courts to insure that resource owners 
are not gouged.194 Nor should it be forgotten that the courts are not strangers 
to the types of valuation questions posed by TDR. This p oint is underscored 
by the large volume of litigation dealing with such matters as benefit assess­
ment levies, special benefits in partial takings situations, and growth control 
and resource protection programs-which, if the thesis of this article is 
correct, are harbingers of the accommodation power. And with the wildfire 
adoption of these programs in the 70's, a corresponding increase in judicial 
familiarity with, and sophistication in resolving, questions arising under that 
power can be anticipated. 
b. Tudor Parks:  Old Wine in New Bo ttles. The occasion for the Tudor 
Parks litigation was New York City's enactment of a TDR program195 in 
1972 to bar the construction that the R-10 zoning then in effect permitted 
on two privately owned parks surrounded by the Tudor City apartment-hotel 
complex. The program places the parks in a P overlay district, limiting their 
use to passive recreational uses, and authorizes the developer-owner to transfer 
their full complement of unused rights to a mid-Manhattan transfer district ; 
it also requires that the parks be opened to the general public but only after 
the city has certified the first transfer of rights from them.196 In permitting 
the transfer authorization to exceed the minimum amount of rights necessary 
to insure a Reasonable Beneficial Use return, the program is more lenient 
than our hard case. It is significant too that land values in the commercially 
zoned transfer district, where the developer-owner has extensive holdings, 
are double those in the residentially zoned Tudor City area197-although this 
advantage must be temporarily discounted in light of the currently overbuilt 
state of New York City's office-commercial space market. 
Despite these advantages, the developer's self-initiated attempt to transfer 
the park's rights to a contemplated proj ect sited adjacent to the Tudor City 
complex,198 and the tender of a "substantial offer"199 to the developer for 
the rights transferable under the TDR p rogram, both the developer and its 
mortgagee brought an inverse condemnation action against the city. They 
sought summary j udgment on the ground that the P zoning is a literal taking 
for which j ust compensation must be paid. Although the trial court agreed 
that a "taking" had occurred, it did not award compensation, but reinstated 
the prior R- 1 0  zoning classification instead.200 
194. See authorities cited in notes 168, 187 supra. 
195. New York, N.Y., Zoning Resolution, art. IX, §§ 91 -00 et seq. ( 1973 ) .  
196. For a detailed discussion o f  the Tudor Parks T D R  program, see Marcus, suprn 
note 1 75, at 79-85. 
197. Id. at 83-84. 
198. Id. at 80-81.  
199. Id. at 84, n.22. 
200. Fred F. French Inv. Co. v. City of New York, 77 Misc. 2d 1 99, 204-05, 352 
N.Y.S.2d 762, 767-68 ( Sup. Ct. 1973 ) .  
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Employing a divide-and-conquer rationale, the court rigidly compart­
mentalized the program's two components, evaluating each in isolation from 
the other. Looking first to the P zoning, it concluded that the use restriction 
was an unreasonable exercise of the police power because it "significantly 
deprives the [mortgagee] of its security for the mortgage," and "bars the 
[developer] from any economic use of [ its] .property."201 Were P zoning 
the whole of the program, of course, the court's reasoning would be incontro-· 
vertible. Indeed, the program would then be the legal equivalent of a Ramapo 
plan which retained only the 18-year subdivision restriction and not the net­
work of economic t rade-offs that saved that restriction from invalidation. 
But there is more to the Tudor Parks program-namely, its transfer 
component. If the court had treated this component as an integral part of the 
overall scheme, it might have altered its conclusion that the P zoning was 
enacted under the police power, and tested the compensation afforded by the 
transfer authorization against a measure less demanding than that of eminent 
domain law. Regrettably, the court did neither ; instead, its assessment of the 
transfer authorization is as perfunctory as it is unenlightening. Viewing the 
authorization as evidence that the city recognized the "need of some modicum 
of compensation, "202 the court dismissed it in the following single sentence : 
Pursuant to [ the TDR program] the owner is confronted with 
the problem of acquiring 30,000 square feet of property suitable for 
his purpose in the newly proscribed [ sic] area but he is left to his 
own resources for acquisition and funding in what may be an unpre­
dictable market of the future.203 
The trial court's opinion is unfortunate, both in its offhand consideration 
of the transfer authorization's potential as fair compensation and in its deci­
sion to invalidate the TDR program by summary judgment. In neither regard 
does its handling of the case respect the constraints attaching to what was 
really a constitutional attack on a TDR program as applied. This is not neces-
201 . Id. at 202-03, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 766. 
202. Id. at 201, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 764. 
203. Id. at 201, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 765. 
The court erred in its assumption that the TDR program limits transfers only to 
transferee sites that the transferor owns. In fact, the rights are transferable to sites of 
non-transferors as well, thereby vastly enlarging their market. See New York, N.Y., 
Zoning Resolution art. IX § §  99-00 et seq. ( 1973 ) .  Also prejudicial in the program's 
analysis was the court's implication that the developer's prospects for financial success 
at the Tudor Parks' site is all but guaranteed, while development elsewhere would be 
a high risk venture. As the unhappy outcome of the Old Stock Exchange controversy, 
see text accompanying notes 251-52, warns, however, prospects for success in either case 
are hardly assured. Relevant to this point is Ada Louise Huxtable's tongue-in-cheek 
suggestion that, in view of the collapse of New York City's office space market in the 
early 70's, the owner of the Grand Central Terminal should perhaps compensate the 
City of New York for rescuing it from the financial debacle that almost certainly would 
have occurred had it not been blocked by the city from going ahead with plans for 
the construction of a second Pan American-type office building atop that landmark struc� 
ture. See, Huxtable, Why Did We Lose Grand Central as a Landmark?, N.Y. Times, 
Feb. 2, 1975, § 2 ( Arts & Leisure), at 26, col. 1 .  The litigation arising from the city's 
attempt to prevent this constraction is discussed in notes 210, 229 infra. 
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sarily to claim that the result should go the other way if premised on a 
thorough consideration of Tudor Parks' facts, but rather to underscore that, 
by failing to make proper inquiry, the court reached its conclusion in an 
informational vacuum. 
Paradoxically, the ingredients that might have led to a denial of the 
summary judgment motion and a trial on the compensation question are 
present in the trial court's reasoning. To its credit, the court rej ected the 
plaintiffs' premise that the police and eminent domain powers are correla­
tives .204 B y  dismissing their inverse condemnation claim out of hand, it rec­
ognized that a regulatory measure exceeding the police power's ambit is not 
ipso facto an exercise of the eminent domain power. Further, it affirmed the 
Reasonable Beneficial Use standard as the determinant of when a regulatory 
measure requires compensation.205 I n  remarking on the developer's earlier 
self-initiated request for a transfer authorization,206 moreover, the court 
surely was aware that, even from the developer's viewpoint, the TDR solution 
contains enough promise of recompense to be taken seriously. Again, it appears 
to have had a glimmering of the propriety of intermediate compensatory 
formats b ecause it spoke of a "modicum of compensation"207 and of compensa­
tion that is "fair" and "reasonable."208 Finally, it appreciated the futility of 
forcing the city down the eminent domain path in observing that the cost of 
outright public acquisition of the parks would be "extremely high."209 
Tudor Parks is now pending before the New York Court of Appeals. As 
the author of the Ramapo and Newport Associates decisions, that tribunal, it 
can be ventured, will prove more discerning in its evaluation of these factors. 
Hopefully, it will not overlook the opportunity that Tudor Parks affords for 
the "re-examination of . . .  judicial and legal thinking in [the compensation] 
area" called for by Judge Breitel in Ramapo.210 
204. Id. at 204-05, 352 N.Y.S2d 767-68. 
205. Id. at 202, 352 N.Y.S.2d 765-66. 
206. Id. at 201, 352 N.Y.S.2d 764. 
207. Id. 
208. Id. at 203, 352 N.Y.S.2d 766. 
209. Id. at 204, 352 N.Y.S.2d 767. 
210. Although the discussion in text focuses on Tudor Parks, its ramifications for 
two recent New York cases invalidating landmark designations as takings are patent 
because the TDR option provided under the New York City landmarks program, see 
note 1 70 snpra, was available to both landmark owners. See Lutheran Church in America 
v. City of New York, 35 N.Y.2d 121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1974) (J . P. 
Morgan Mansion) and Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New York, Index No. 
14763/69 ( Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1975 ) ( Grand Central Terminal ) .  Of the two cases, 
Lutheran Church is the more inexplicable because the landmark owner had not made 
a factual showing of economic hardship, absent which the Reasonable Beneficial Use 
�tandard _presumably ought to have applied to bar its taking claim. See Lutheran Church 
m America y. Ci�y of �ew York, id. at 132, 316 N .�.2d at 312, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 17 
(Ja_sen, J., d1ssentmg) .  Smee the court expressly reframed from declaring the landmark 
o;dmance facially invalid, see id. at 131, 316 N.E.2d at 31 1 , 359 N.Y.S.2d at 16, and yet 
�1d not have before it facts establishing the ordinance's invalidity as applied its decision 
is doubly puzzling. Moreover, even if economic hardship is assumed the c�urt's failure 
to examinl'. th<; TDR op.tion'� suitability as an adequate compensatory alternative hardly squares with its reasomng m Ramapo, see text accompanying notes 145-52 supra, a 
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C. Institutional Responsibilities Under the Accommodation Power 
1 .  lntegra.tion of the Police and Eminent Doniain Powers : An In­
complete Model. 
A convenient point of departure for deciding who should do what under 
the accommodation power is to look at its closest theoretical analogue-the 
notion of "integrating" the police and eminent domain powers. A perennial 
source of contention among the commentators, this notion has precipitated a 
cleavage as sharp as the one dividing the police power enthusiasts and the 
private marketeers, whose dispute derives from roughly parallel considerations. 
Opponents of integration211-which they tend to equate with permitting 
inverse condemnation actions against regulatory authorities-have put forth 
a catalog of by-now familiar objections : the notion's potential for unexpected 
and drastic liability would inhibit public planning initiatives ; its reliance on 
monetary relief to cure "illegal" public actions rather than on injunctive relief 
(which merely revokes the defective regulation) is misconceived ; integration 
would put courts in the business of allocating public resources at the behest of 
private claimants, instead of leaving that j ob to legislatures responding to 
general public needs ; and, finally, it is pregnant with all manner of adminis­
trative c_omplexities-the kind of property interest if any (fee or less-than-fee, 
permanent or temporary) that government would receive for the compensation 
paid, which measure of compensation to prescribe, and the legal contingencies 
point implicitly recognized by Judge Jasen in a dissenting opinion in which Chief Judge 
Breitel joined. Id. at 133 n.2, 316 N.E.2d at 313 n.2, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 18 n.2. 
Penn Central, on the other hand, is a twin to Tudor Parks in its blithe dismissal 
of the TDR option. Dubiously interpreting Lutheran Church as holding that "landmarks 
designation generally constitutes a taking for which compensation is mandated," id. at 
8, the court rejected the TDR option with the blanket assertion that it "neither provided 
compensation to plaintiffs nor minimized the harm suffered by plaintiffs due to the 
designation of the Terminal as a landmark." Penn Central Trans. Co. v. City of New 
York, Index No. 14763, Findings of Fact and Declarations of Law at 8 ( Sup. Ct. 1975) .  
But the option clearly does both, as the city established at trial. The issue that the court 
ought to have explored is a good deal more fine-grained : whether the extent of com­
pensation or degree of minimization of harm afforded by the option (as well as by tax 
abatement advantages and other concessions that the city has long afforded to Penn 
Central and its predecessor) reduced the plaintiffs' inj ury to a level that comports 
with the Reasonable Beneficial Use standard. Since the court failed to discuss the 
standards that it was applying-though it apparently leaned strongly toward those of 
eminent domain-its opinion is both elliptical and conclusory. Penn Central's oracular 
posture, together with its extreme reading of the admittedly confusing Lutheran Church 
d�ision, bespeaks tl:ie need for searching review and clarification in the appeal that the 
city has lodged. 
Taken together, Lutheran Church and Penn Central cast a pall not only on the 
future of landmarks preservation in New York City, see Huxtable, Landmarks Are in 
Trouble with the Law, N.Y. Times, Dec. 22, 1 974, § A at 2, col. 1, but on the entire 
fabric of legitimate public governance so thoughtfully woven in Ramapo. At their very 
best, these cases represent a serious r.etrogression from Judge Breitel's call for the 
�rely needed re-evaluation of outmoded doctrine that serves neither public nor private 
mterests. 
211. See, e.g., Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the fotegration of Police Power 
and Eminent Domain by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation, 1968 
URB.A� L. ANN. 1 ;  Note, Inverse Condemnation :  Its Availability in Challenging the Validity of a Zoning Ordinance, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1439 (1974) ; 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1 134 
(1953) .  
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circumscribing government's power to repeal obsolete restrictions. Support­
ers212 of integration counter with an equally familiar litany : requiring gov­
ernment to compensate would enhance rational public decision-making by 
exposing the true costs of regulation ; it would protect individual liberty by 
safeguarding private rights from governmental over-reaching ; and it would 
insure the integrity of comprehensive planning by preventing rather than 
licensing discordant private development. 
How is one to choose sides if, as this writer believes, the arguments of 
both are equally plausible in the abstract ? Intelligent choice is impossible 
absent a coherent conception both of what is meant by "integration" and of 
the quite different contexts to which it pertains. Current commentary and 
case law afford neither. Their persistence in mis-equating the "police power" 
with "regulation" retards progress on both counts. Further, while many com­
mentators have rightly impugned the either/or posture of current thought,21
3 
they have not as yet offered prescriptions that dissolve the policy and doctrinal 
blockages of the two powers. Illustrative of unproductive judicial attitudes 
are the vague musings of one court about achieving fairer public governance 
by "overlaying the police power with the requirement of just compensation,"214 
a neat trick which is likely to be about as helpful as trying to make toast by 
plugging an AC toaster into a DC circuit.215 
The debate's edge has been similarly dulled by its inattention to contexts. 
Two can be identified, each entailing private challenges to a regulatory pro­
gram's restrictions, but differing from each other in terms of their legislative 
character. The first, exemplified by conventional zoning, comprehends those 
212. See, e.g., R. BABCOCK, T H E  ZONING GAME 168-72 ( 1966) ; Hadler, M1111icipal 
Zo11i11g Liability ia Damages-A New Cause of Action, 5 URBAN LAW. 25 ( 1973 ) ; Van 
Alstyne, Stat1itory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: The Scope of Legislative 
Power, 1 9  STAN. L. REV. 727 ( 1967) ; Bosselman, The Third A lternative in Zoning 
Litigation, 1 7  ZONING DIGEST 1 1 3  ( 1965 ) .  
2 1 3. See authorities cited i n  note 212 supra. 
An especia lly thoughtful treatment of the inadequacies of the either /or syndrome 
appears in the Bossclman article cited in note 212 supra. Although Mr. Bosselman's 
vi ews on the compensation question appear to have changed substantially in recent years, 
s1·e T A K ING, supra note 5, his 1965 proposal for a "third alternative" to the traditional 
pol ic� an� eminent domain power responses to that question is, in my judgment, a fresh 
contnbut 1011 to land use thought. Despite fundamental differences between the approaches 
ad vocat�d in that and the present article-Mr. Bosselman, for example, does not call 
for an mdcpendent third power as do I-Mr. Bosselman's thesis has significantly m­
Ruen�ed the viewpoint expressed in this article, and my debt to him is substantial. It has 
als<;> mRuenced the A LI Model Land Development Code, of which Mr. Bosselman is As­
sociat_c Reporter, with respect to Code provisions authorizing courts to key eminent do111a111 cornp<'nsation awards to what is an analogue to the Reasonable Beneficial Use 
standard , .rrr Co<le § 5-303 ( 5 ) .  and to grant local govern men ts the option of curing con­
fiscatory land use measures through compensation. Id. at § 9- 1 12 ( 3 ) .  
2 1 4. H FH, Ltd. v .  Superior Co�rt, 1 1 6  Cal. Rptr. 436, 44 1 (2d Dist. App. Ct. 1974) : 
cf. B rown v. Tahoe Rc�1ona
_
I Planmng Agency, 385 F .. Supp. 1 128 ( D. Nev. 1973 ) .  215 .  T h e  ovcrs1mphficat1on that the po lice and eminent domain powers can somehow 
be nll'TKCd or . supenmposcd or� o.ne . a!1other w1.thout undergo ing a fundamental trans­
!ormat1.on m kmd also !IPPears m _J Ud1c1al reasonmg approv i ng programs in which zoning 
1s pr�d1cated on the cmment domam power. See note 130 supra. See generally text accom­
panymg notes 52-67. 
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restrictions adopted by legislatures i n  the good faith belief that they comport 
with the police power.216 The second, illustrated by the kinds of resource 
protection217 and growth management218 initiatives considered earlier, covers 
borderline restrictions. Because they are recognized as such by the legislature, 
it buttresses them with . a compensatory supplement, such as the network of 
economic trade-offs in Ramapo or TDR i n  Tudor Parks. The legislature may 
direct the administering authority to extend the compensatory supplement 
automatically, as in these examples, or it may provide that compensation be 
afforded only if a court rules that, without it, the restriction would be in­
valid.219 Under the first alternative, the court reviews the proffered compen­
sation's compatibility with the fair compensation standard ; under the latter, 
it decides the threshold question whether or not the restriction passes muster 
under the police power. In neither case may it enjoin enforcement of the 
restriction, however. Instead, it must provisionally grant appropriate compen­
satory relief, staying its order for a reasonable period to allow the administer­
ing agency to elect between compensating or, if necessary resources are lacking, 
liberalizing the offending restriction in accordance with the Reasonable Bene­
ficial Use standard. 220 
Restrictions i n  this second context can be reviewed in alternative ways. 
In one, the courts alone can pass on whether the challenged restriction is 
constitutional as applied, and can fix fair compensation if the program of 
which it is a part affords an insufficient compensatory supplement or none at 
all.221 In the second, these responsibilities devolve initially upon an adminis­
trative agency whose determinations o n  both counts are expressly made 
subject to judicial review.222 
By introducing the accommodation power and distinguishing between the 
two frameworks, the terms of the debate about integration are sufficiently 
clarified, I believe, to weigh properly the various arguments advanced for and 
against a more systematic compensation practice. Offered here is a compromise 
position : private litigants should not be permitted to compel government to 
compensate for overbroad regulatory measures ; but, to deal fairly with land­
owners and to enhance the prospect for effective regulation, government 
should resort to the accommodation power whenever it recognizes beforehand 
that restrictions it imposes may not be defensible under the police power. 
216. For a treatment of alternative remedies that are appropriate in this frame­
work, see text accompanying notes 49-51 and note 167 supra. 
217. See text accompanying notes 168-73 supra. 
218. See text accompanying notes 145-53 supra. 
. 219. See PUERTO Rrco PLAN, supra note 13 ; cf. text accompanying notes 233-51 
infra, discussing Massachusetts statutes imposing height limitations adjacent to the state 
capitol building and providing public access to the state's beaches. 
220. An analogous judicial role is prescribed in Code § 9-1 12 ( 3) . 
. 221. Cf. the Massachusetts statutes discussed in text accompanying notes 233-50 
infra. 
222. See PUERTO Rrco PLAN, supra note 13, at 9-16. 
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None of the obj ections to a systematic compensation p
ractice i� persuasive 
against this resolution. Under it , compensation costs w il l 
he neither unex­
pected nor drastic. For one thing, the legislature will have 
.t he chance to 
anticipate them in formulating the regulations, while court s w
i l l  not be able 
to award them on their own authority. Second, compensat ion can tak
e the form 
of dollar or non-dollar awards keyed to the Reasonable Beneficial
 Use stan­
dard, rather than dollars only, keyed to the Highest and Best L' se sta
ndard. 
Finally, if the administering authority lacks the resources,  or power, to com­
pensate, it can still implement its program by easing a defect ive restriction, 
much as local governments grant variances under conventional zoning. With 
such flexibility, any apprehension that public plann ing i nitiat ives will be in­
hibited seems misplaced. The argument which favors i n j u nct i ve over com­
pensatory relief for illegal public action also loses force when a range of cura­
tives for the possible illegal ity are built  into the very progra111 under which 
the action is  taken. Similarly academic is  the issue of who. as bet ween legisla­
tures and courts; should be the allocator of public resources. The legislature's 
adoption of programs under the accom11 1odation power s igna ls its decision 
that, if available, compensation be afforded where necessary. :\ nd since courts 
may not compel compensatory relief in eithe r context, the dec is ion to compen­
sate always remains with the legislature or administering agency .  
Nor i s  t h e  potential complexity of administering accom111odation power­
based programs fatal to their adoption.223 Against this complexity must be 
weighed fairness and government's capacity to manage land use. 1 f complexity 
outweighs fairness, then by the same reasoning, the Fift h A111endrnent should 
be excised from the federal Constitution because the acl111inistrative burdens of 
eminent domain far surpass those of the accommodation power. As to the 
programs' technical demands, confidence in government appears warranted 
in view of the favorable results recorded in recent years under a variety of 
innovative land use techniques224 which rival accommodation power-based 
programs i n  complexity. Experience with these innovations,  moreover, sug­
gests that legislatures will enact accommodation power-based programs on a 
selective, tightly circumscribed basis, and can thus progressively refine their 
treatment of technical issues. 
Last to be evaluated is the prediction that a systematic compensation 
. 223 . !he mo�t detai.led �atalog o! the legal and administrative conundrums associated with the mtegratton notion 1s found 111 Beuscher supra note 211 E t · ·d · and rebutt I f p f B h , . 
' 
· x ens1ve cons1 erat1on . a o ro essor. eusc er.s specific obj ections are beyond the sco e of this '.lrt1cle. �r . a comprehensive analysis of these obj ections, concluding that th�y are not 111s1;1pera e 111 the context of the second framework identified in tex · Chicago Plan: Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Vrba L t, Jee iost�51sH The L. R2� 5574, 589-602, 611-20 ( 1972) ; PuERTo Rico Pr.AN,. supra '�ot:"13111� �-26 
ARV. 
· 
ee generally J. CosTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT ' LAN p ' · MARKETPLACE 28-42 ( 1974) . THE NEW ZONING ' L. DMARK RESERVATION AND THE CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES' (N. Marcus and M GAL, ADMINISTRATIVE _AND EcoNOMIC From Eitelid to Ramapo : New Directions in L'andr°(/s eCds. 1970) ; Elliott & Marcus, 56 ( 1973) .  se ontrols, 1 HOFSTRA L. REv. 
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practice will unleash a firestorm of l itigation. It is difficult to gauge whether 
accommodation power-based programs will generate more litigation than 
arises currently from the practice of pushing the police power to its outer 
limits and beyond. Experience in England225 and, on a more limited basis, at 
home226 shows that surprisingly few claims tend to be prosecuted when com­
pensation is afforded as a curative for overbroad regulatory measures. Litiga­
tion can also be restrained, should a particular program nonetheless trigger a 
large number of claims, by the use of administrative agencies to screen and, 
in many instances, to dispose of these claims. Even a material increase in 
litigation, however, would seem an acceptable price to pay for the concomitant 
advantage of strengthening the legal, political and ethical foundations of 
public governance. 
The proposed resolution is also sensitive to the concerns of the advocates 
of the integration notion although it does stop short of endorsing their in­
sistence upon inverse condemnation as the tool to control excesses under the 
police power. Enactment of regulatory programs within the accommodation 
power framework assumes that the legislature has assessed their probable 
costs and has made the policy judgment that, as a matter of fairness, the 
public sector should either bear these costs or reduce them to a constitutionally 
tolerable level by the variance route. Incursions on individual liberty will 
certainly occur less frequently than under current practice. Further, the com­
prehensive plan will be less vulnerable to hole-poking: this outcome will be 
avoided altogether when compensation is afforded, and it will be held within 
narrower bonds when, lacking compensatory resources, government instead 
permits incremental density increases. 
Left unremedied by my proposed resolution are the private losses incurred 
between passage of a defective measure and a decision by the regulatory au­
thority to forego the compensatory option. The decision to leave these losses 
with the landowner is not reached lightly. Time truly is money for the real 
225. See TAKING, supra note 5, 276, 279-83. 
226. Empirical data on this question is scant because of the limited compensation 
practice in the United States. Two possibly useful indicators of the probability of a 
minimal claims response can be cited, however. First, the Massachusetts Coastal Wet­
lands Act of 1965, 130 MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 105 ( Supp. 1971 ) ,  authorizes local 
governments to impose "coastal protective orders," which effectively prohibit any sub­
stantial development activity in the area protected. Should a reviewing court agree with 
a private challenge that a given order is confiscatory, it may grant the local govern­
ment an option to cure the order through compensation. In a study of experience under 
the act, Fred Bosselman and David Callies reported that while over "two thirds of 
[the state's] coastal wetlands [are] covered by protective orders . . .  actual negotiations 
have been required with only about 100 owners and . . .  only one objection will come 
to trial in the courts ; "  F. BosSELMAN and D. CALLIES, THE QUIET REVOLUTION IN 
LAND UsE CONTROL 225 (197 1 ) .  Second, while municipal landmark ordinances typically 
provide for a real estate tax reduction for designated landmark properties, a survey of 
12 American cities conducted by the writer in 1970 indicated that such reductions had 
been afforded in only one city and were seldom requested by landmark owners. See 
Costonis, The Chicago Plan : Incentive Zoning and the Preservation of Urba1i Land­
marks, 85 HARV. L. REV. 574, 578 n.18 ( 1972) . 
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estate community,2:11 and more than one regulatory authority ha
s forced a 
developer into bankruptcy by playing a waiting game i n  which it holds
 the 
trump card. But, while courts should deal sternly with bad faith or ?alpably 
unreasonable exercises of the police power,
228 they should not otherwise com-
£ " t k. "229 H ti o · f pel government to compensate or a temporary a mg. ere, 1 se avor-
ing leeway for government to discharge its planning responsibilities have the 
better of the argument, in my j udgment. But the question of how to treat these 
losses is a close one, the most troublesome policy issue posed by the discussion 
in this subsection. 
2. The A ccommodation Power : A Blueprint for Institutional Teamwork. 
a. The Legislatures. Primary responsibility for nurturing the accommo­
dation power must rest with the legislature. Cognizant that desirable land 
use programs can cast undue losses on some landowners, the legislature should 
backstop what is currently regarded as the police power dimension of these 
programs with a compensatory supplement predicated on the accommodation 
power and fair compensation. 
In addition to their status as program formulators, legislatures will have 
other leadership functions. If local governments are to implement the program, 
they will need some legal foundation to do so, such as an enabling act adopted 
by the state legislature. Of the three departments of government, moreover, 
the legislature is best fitted to define those community values which should 
be protected through land use regimes, to assess the likely regulatory and fiscal 
impacts of those regimes, and to devise appropriate compensatory formats 
when necessary. In addressing these issues, of course, they will also fix stan­
dards that determine which private expectancies are "property," in the sense 
227. For a breakdown of the dollar costs that developers i n  Puerto Rico incur as a 
result of delays in receiving development approvals from the Puerto Rico Planning 
Board, sec PUERTO Rico PLAN, supra note 1 3, at 46-47. 
228. Cf. Klopping v. City of Whittier, 8 Cal. 3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal . Rptr. 1 g���� .; Peacock v. County of Sacramento, 271 Cal. App. 2d 845, 77 Cal. Rptr. 391 
. 229. An example of the stagger!ng liabi.lities that t�e government might incur appears m the �aga of Grand Central Terminal, which was designated as a New York City land­mark m 1967. The . predecessor to the .Penn Central Corporation, the site's present owner, had entered mto a groundlease with a developer which anticipated construction of a second Pa� American-type office building over the landmark and called for annual lease paxments m the order ?f .$2.2 million. But construction was barred by the New York City Landmarks Comm1ss10n because of the Terminal's landmark status In 1975 a New York trial court declared the designation a taking. See note 2 1 0  supra Assuming tha� damages for a tempo�ary taking between 1 967 and 1 975 were calculated on the basis of the gr�:mndlease s mcome stream, they could run upwards of $ 1 5  million See gencra./ly Huxtable, Why Did We Lose Grand Central as a Landmark r N y T0imes Feb. 2, 1975, ' 2 (Arts & Leisure) a� 26, col. 1 .  For the view that compens�ti�n for � temporz'.'1 taking ought t? be payable m such instances, see Comment, Landmark Preser­v
1
ation aws : Compens<!tion for a Temporary Taking, 35 U. CHI. L. REv 362 ( 1968) · c · Lamarch Corp. v. City of Englewood, 51 N.J. 108, 237 A.2d 881 ( 1968) :  
'
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that their invasion requires compensation at all. This last determination will 
also afford the kind · of guidance so long neglected and sorely needed for the 
rational development of police and eminent domain doctrine generally. 
b. Administering and Administrati-ve Agencies. While some accommoda­
tion power-based programs will be directly implemented by state or regional 
entities, many will fall within the province of local governments. To the extent 
that these local bodies prosecute such programs under general enabling acts, 
they can be regarded as legislatures in the sense used here. City councils and 
county boards of supervisors can be expected to delegate the programs' actual 
administration to the entity referred to in the American Law Institute Model 
Land Development Code as the "local land development agency."230 This 
umbrella term includes existing plan commissions; urban renewal authorities, 
landmark commissions, and the like. Because it will be the j ob of that agency 
to implement legislative mandates in light of the circumstances in the pertinent 
jurisdiction, it must be staffed with individuals knowledgeable in the legal, 
planning and land economics-appraisal fields, and . it must receive forceful 
political backing. 
Administrative agencies may also serve as claims commissions. State and 
regional agencies are more likely to carry out this function because their ad­
ministrative staff's, resources and broader planning concerns permit a more 
sophisticated and systematic treatment of private claims than would be feasible 
for many local governments. While it might be inappropriate to vest both 
program administration and claims adjudication functions in the same agency, 
the separate agencies charged with these respective tasks should routinely 
touch base with one another to coordinate the pertinent program's regulatory 
and fiscal aspects. 
c. The Courts. And then there are the courts. Their role in the compen­
sation quandary has been so troubled that influential commentators have 
urged that it be sharply de-emphasized, if not eliminated altogether.231 While 
active legislative involvement of the type described above should .diminish 
the courts' role considerably, it will not and, in my judgment, should not, 
reduce them to bit players. The federal and state constitutions, after all, install 
the courts as the ultimate arbiters of the c ompensation question, a mainstay 
in contemporary land use litigation. As Ramapo and Tudor Parks confirm, 
it is inevitable that accommodation power-based programs will come before 
the courts, especially in the early years of that power's doctrinal elaboration. 
The assessment of the judiciary's role found in the earlier discussion of those 
cases232 will not be repeated here. Instead, this section closes with a critique 
230. See CODE sttj>ra note 167, §§ 2-301 to -3 1 2. 
231. See authorities cited note 121 supra. 
232. See text accompanying notes 145-67, 195-210 supra. 
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of three M assachusetts decisions-two vintage233 and o n e  modern2:14-which, 
in negating the judicial-legislative teamwork required for the conduct of these 
programs, threaten to strangle the accommodation power in its crib. 
The sequence commences innocently enough with A ttorney General v. 
Williams,2a5 in which the court sustained an 1898 statute that imposed height 
limits on the buildings around Boston's Copley Square and provided eminent 
domain relief for the burdened landowners. Sustaining the measure against 
a public use obj ection, the court also volunteered that "it would be hard to 
say that the statute might not have been passed in the exercise of the police 
power. "236 
Emboldened by that dictum, the Massachusetts Legislature imposed 
similar restrictions the following year on parcels adjoining its capitol building 
and provided for eminent domain damages only "if and i nsofar as the act and 
proceedings to enforce it may deprive the (landowners ]  of rights existing 
under the constitution."237 In Parker v. Commonwealth ,2a8 the State Attorney 
General's demurrer to the landowners' petition for eminent domain damages 
was sustained by the trial court. On review, the then-Chief Justice Holmes, 
in his opinion for the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, stated that the 
attorney general construed the statute "as importing an exercise of the police 
power so far as the legislature could constitutionally go, and as saving a rem­
edy for all damages beyond that point. "239 Without deciding whether the 
measure was :valid under the police power, Holmes rejected this construction, 
reasoning that : 
w�ile we cai: gather. that the legislature was willing to take anything without paym� for it that this court should say that it could, we do 
not find .anythmg that even suggest s a legislative adjudication that th� pubhc. welfare requires that petitioners' property should be re­stricted without compensation t o  them.240 
The defect in the attorney general's position, according to Holmes, was that 
the statute: 
gives a r�me?y if the act deprives the parties of rights existing under the constituti�:m. In the ab�ence of a':1 .adjudfcation by the Legislature th.at the public nee�s reqmre the pettt10ners property to be restricted 
":'1thout compensation, the �tatute does deprive the parties of such nghts, and on the construction of the statute which we adopt there has been no such adjudication.u1 
233. Attorney General v. Williams, 1 74 Mass. 476, 55 N E 77 ( 1899) ; Parker v. Commonwealth, 1�8 . Mass. 199, 59 N.E. 634 ( 1901 ) .  
· · 
234. In re Opm1on of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561 ( 1974) . 235. 174 Mass. 476, 55 N.E. 77 ( 1899) . 236. Id. at 478, 55 N.E. at 77. 
237. Parker v. Commonwealth, 1 78 Mass. 199 203 59 N E  634, 634 ( 1901 )  (as paraphrased by Holmes, C. J.) .  ' ' 
· 
· 
238. Id. 
239. Id. at 204, 59 N.E. at 635. 240. Id. at 204-05, 59 N.E. at 635. 241. Id. at 205, 59 N.E. at 635. 
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Accordingly, he remanded the action so that damages could be assessed and 
awarded to the landowners. 
The Parker result turned on statutory construction rather than on 
constitutional grounds. Seventy-five years later in In Re Opinion of the Jus­
tices,242 however, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court hinted that such 
a measure, inviting the court to determine whether or not there was a taking 
and to fix appropriate eminent domain damages if there were, might run 
afoul of the separation of powers doctrine. At issue in that advisory opinion 
was the constitutionality of a clumsily drafted bill243 intended to provide public 
access to the stretch of state coastline between the mean high water and 
extreme low water line. Because a colonial legislature in 1649 had granted 
title to this zone to littoral owners subject to a general reservation of public 
rights, the Massachusetts Legislature was uncertain of the measure's status 
under the police power. Wishing to insure public access even if it had to 
compensate, the legislature authorized record owners of littoral property to 
test the question under the state's condemnation statute and to be awarded 
compensation should the court determine that the public rights reserved under 
the 1649 act did not include beach access. Invalidating the 1974 measure 
on a variety of grounds not pertinent here, the court also warned that the 
legislature's forward pass to the j udiciary "raise [ s]  serious constitutional 
questions"2H with respect to the separation of powers doctrine. 
A critique of Parker and In Re Opinion of the Justices might best com­
mence with the latter's hint that the legislative-judicial teamwork envisaged 
under accommodation power-based programs encroaches on the separation of 
powers doctrine. I n  addition to those fundamental differences which allow 
the beach access bill to be readily distinguished from the accommodation 
power variants portrayed earlier,245 the opinion affords on other grounds a 
poorly reasoned basis for vetoing this teamwork. As the court viewed it, the 
bill "attempts to transfer from the Legislature to the courts . . . the decision 
whether or not to compensate, that is, whether or not to exercise the power 
of eminent domain."246 Were this truly so, there would indeed be cause both 
for constitutional concern and for doubts about a policy of allowing courts 
rather than legislatures to allocate public resources. But the beach access bill 
and, even more certainly, the accommodation power variants envisage noth-
242. 313 N.E.2d 561 ( 1974) . 
243. An Act Authorizing Public Right-of-Passage Along Certain Coastlines of the 
Commonwealth, House No. 481, reproduced in id. at 563-64. 
244. 313 N.E.2d 561, 569 ( 1 974 ) .  . 
245. The key difference is that the Massachusetts bill was facially unconstitutional, 
see id. at 568, while accommodation power-based measures, such as the Tudor Parks TDR 
program, if unconstitutional at all, will be so only in their application to specific properties. 
See text accompanying notes 186-94 supra. A s  a result of poor draftsmanship, moreover, 
the Massachusetts bill was defective on a number of procedural due process grounds, see 
In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 569-71 ( 1974). 
246. In re Opinion of the Justices, 313 N.E.2d 561, 569 ( 1 974) .  
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ing of the sort. I n  both instances, the legislature itself has alr
.
eady made the 
decision to award compensation if necessary to reach the desired r�gulatory 
result. Recognizing that compensation may not be required i n  border
.
line cases 
-witness the dictum in Attorney General v. Williams241-and bemg prop­
erly chary of the needless expenditure of scarce public r esources, the legis­
lature has simply chosen to await a judicial determination of the measure's 
adequacy before committing these resources. Under these circumstances, the 
court is no more a party to violation of the separation of powers doctrine 
than it is in any run-of-the-mill eminent domain case. 
In short, if it is no violation of that doctrine for a court to adjudicate 
these two issues in separate proceedings, why is it violated if a court deter­
mines them in consolidated proceedings under circumstances in which the 
legislature has already agreed that compensation be paid if  necessary ?  
Taken at face value, moreover, the court's reasoning would directly im­
pugn the constitutionality of inverse condemnation proceedings. These pro­
ceedings address the same issues-whether the challenged public action is 
sustainable under the police power and, if not, what compen sation is due 
the private challenger_:without being tagged illegal . Yet, uncfer the court's 
rationale, they are even more objectionable because they take place in a set­
ting where the legislature not only has given no prior indication of its willing­
ness to compensate but has instead indicated precisely the opposite. 
If constitutional objections to legislative-judicial teamwork are spurious, 
does the team work do violence to the judiciary's status in any other credible 
respect ? I think not. Holmes' opinion in Parker is elliptical in this regard, 
resting instead on a narrow question of statutory interpretation. Yet even on 
that level, the opinion dissembles. First, he construes the 1 899 statute not to 
be a "legislative adjudication that the public welfare requires that the [ land­
owners' property] should be restricted without compensation to them,"248 
and then he concedes that, under the statute, "the legislature is willing to 
take anything without paying for it that the courts should say that it could."249 
Though made conditional on the outcome of subsequent j udicial review, it 
is evident that the legislature did "adjudicate" that compensation be paid­
unless Holmes would have us believe that all conditional propositions are 
ambiguous. 
Although the reason for Holmes' strained construction must remain a 
matter of speculation, the suggestion is plausible that, because Holmes and 
the courts generally were imbued with the laissez-faire attitude of their 
times,250 they were unlikely to be sympathetic to innovations like the 1899 
statute. Also, they were likely to be reluctant, in any event, to  become em-
247. See note 236 and accompanying text supra. 
248. Parker v. Commonwealth, 1 78 Mass. 199 205 59 N E  634 635 ( 1 901 ) . 249. Id. at 204-05, 59 N.E. 634, 634-35 ( 1901 )
'
. 
' . . ' 
250. See authority cited in note 48 supra. 
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broiled in the type of fine-tuning that the legislature requested, when it 
offered the court only a passing reference to "constitutional rights" to guide 
it in resolving the taking question. Today, if not then, that reluctance is mis­
conceived. Private rights are no longer accorded great deference when they 
conflict with sound public goals.  And, while both the complexity of the re­
quired fine-tuning and the legislative default in aiding the courts continue, 
a judicial retort of "After you, Alphonse" will only serve to perpetuate con­
fused taking doctrine and, in the process, to condone unfair land use measures. 
Whether they like it or not, courts are and will continue to be faced with 
a plethora of actions challenging regulatory measures on confiscation grounds. 
It would serve their interests, as well as those of regulatory authorities and 
the private sector, to encourage legislative initiatives, such as accommodation 
power-based programs, that afford a fair, rational and systematic judgmental 
framework for dealing with the compensation question. 
CONCLUSION 
The Old Stock Exchange Building, a fragile business palace · marrying 
grace with utility, stood proudly in the heart of Chicago's Loop in 197 1 .  Con­
ceived by Louis Sullivan and Dankmar Adler, the Exchange won national 
and international acclaim as a gem of the Chicago School of Architecture, 
which, at the turn of the century, created the foundations for modern archi­
tectural design and engineering. Though fully rented and a profitable office 
building in 1968, the Exchange was chastised in 197 1  by its new owners, a 
development syndicate, as economically unviable. The developers then gave 
substance to their charge by refusing to renew the leases of the building's 
tenants. Spurred on by the easy availability of mortgage financing and the 
rash of construction that was then adding five million square feet of office 
space annually to Chicago's totaLinventory of 6()-million square feet, they had 
little use for the 13-story Exchange when Chicago's zoning permitted upwards 
of a 40-story building on the site. Despite the eleventh-hour efforts of the 
press, citizens groups and others to bring the Exchange under the limited 
protection of the city's preservation ordinance, the city council refused to go 
along-lest the Exchange, in the words of one Daley alderman, become known 
as "Chicago's White Elephant."251 The building was torn down in 1972, a 
casualty of market forces. 
But the story does not end there. Shortly after completion of the Ex­
change's pedestrian, 43-story replacement in · 1975, the developers sought a 
court-sanctioned financial reorganization because the new building, they said, 
251. See Committee on Cultural and Economic Development of the Chicago City 
Council, Special Report Relative to Designation of the Old Stock Exchange Building at 
6, 1970. 
1082 COLUMBIA LA W REVIE W 
was "economically unviable. "252 Like many other developers in Chicago and 
other American cities during the late 60's and early 70's, they had badly mis­
read the market, and had failed to see that it would soon be glutted by the 
construction orgy then going on ; as a result, two-thirds of their new building 
was left untenanted. 
The terrible irony of this tale recurs again and again, not only for land­
mark buildings, but for other man-made and natural amenities. To this ob­
server, the near-bankruptcy of the Exchange's developers is dwarfed by the 
larger social bankruptcy that market fatalism portends. But tragic as the loss 
of the Exchange and other amenities surely are, they do not warrant the 
emasculation of constitutional constraints against governmental overreaching 
either, in my judgment. These losses, instead, proclaim two clear messages. 
First is our urgent need for a fresh look at current property conceptions, 
whose inertness all but guarantees mindless repetition of the Stock Exchange 
debacle. Second is the need to preclude future debacles by transforming our 
legal and institutional arrangements so they can accommodate the tensions 
between the dictates of fairness and of effective public governance. 
These tensions, gratuitously inflamed by the current police power/emi­
nent domain deadlock, are the subject of this article. The necessity for recog­
nition of the accommodation power and fair compensation is its thesis. Pre­
vention of the irony recounted in the Old Stock Exchange tale is its goal. 
Bonding these elements together is the underlying conviction-and a greater 
irony still-that government has at hand the means for resolving these ten­
sions but, immobilized by doctrinal rigidities, doesn't seem to know it. 
252. See Warden, Trouble Plagues New Loop Building, Chicago Daily News, Jan. 
23, 1975 at 1 ,  col. 1. 
